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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact about whether the excavation work performed on the site of Midtown 
Village in late 2004 and early 2005 constituted the "commencement to do work or 
furnish materials on the ground for the structure or improvement" within the 
meaning of Utah Code Section 38-1-5? 
A district court's determination that no disputed issues of material fact existed is 
reviewed for correctness. See Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17,17, 
42 P.3d 379 (citation omitted). "'Correctness' means the appellate court decides the 
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). This issue was 
raised below. See BankFirst and Marshall Investments Corporation's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Opposition Memo"), at 
pp. 3-10, 16 [R. 4986, 4992-99]. 
2. Did the District Court err in determining that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact regarding Myler's intent to proceed with construction of Midtown 
Village without interruption following the excavation performed in late 2004 and 
early 2005? 
A district court's determination that no disputed issues of material fact existed is 
reviewed for correctness. See Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^  7, 
42 P.3d 379 (citation omitted). This issue was raised below. See Opposition Memo, at 
pp. 17-24 [R. 4978-85]. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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( 
3. Did the District Court err when it concluded as a matter of law that excavation 
work for the South Tower and the North Tower, which concluded months before 
construction of the South Tower began, was part of a single construction project? 
A district court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correctness. See O'Dea 
v. Oka, 2009 UT 46, T] 15, 217 P.3d 704 (citation omitted). This issue was raised below. 
See Opposition Memo, at pp. 12-24 [R. 4978-90]. 
4. Did the District Court err in determining that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact regarding whether work on Midtown Village was performed pursuant 
to a common plan? i 
A district court's determination that no disputed issues of material fact existed is 
reviewed for correctness. See Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, *|f 7, 
42 P.3d 379 (citation omitted). This issue was raised below. See Opposition Memo, at 
pp. 12-24 [R. 4978-90]. 
5. Did the District Court err in determining that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact regarding whether work on Midtown Village was pursued with 
reasonable promptness after excavation stopped in January 2005 and no other 
work was performed on the site until October 2005? 
i 
A district court's determination that no disputed issues of material fact existed is 
reviewed for correctness. See Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, f 7, 
42 P.3d 379 (citation omitted). This issue was raised below. See Opposition Memo, at , 
pp. 18-24 [R. 4978-84]. 
6. Did the District Court err in determining that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact regarding whether the excavation for the Midtown Village was < 
materially abandoned when no work occurred on-site for at least nine months 
following completion of the excavation work? 
A district court's determination that no disputed issues of material fact existed is 
reviewed for correctness. See Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, % 7, 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 P.3d 379 (citation omitted). This issue was raised below. See Opposition Memo, at 
pp. 18-24 [R. 4978-84]. 
7. Did the District Court err by granting the Lien Claimants' motion for partial 
summary judgment and determining that their mechanic's liens, if proven valid, 
would have priority over UWB's Deed of Trust? 
A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See 
Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, % 10, 127 P.3d 256 (citation omitted). This 
issue was raised below. See Opposition Memo, at pp. 1-3, 24-25 [R.4977-78, 4999-
5001]. 
8. Did the District Court err when it determined that UWB's actual notice of 
excavation work performed prior to the time its Deed of Trust was recorded is 
relevant to the determination of whether such work was sufficient for mechanic's 
liens to relate back to the commencement of such excavation work? 
A district court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correctness. See O'Dea 
v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ^ 15, 217 P.3d 704 (citation omitted). This issue was raised below. 
See Opposition Memo, at pp. 3-10 [R. 4992-99]. 
9. Did the District Court err by admitting into evidence and considering the existence 
of title insurance as evidence of UWB's actual notice that work was underway on 
Midtown Village for which a lien could arise? 
A district court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, Tj 10, 94 P.3d 193 (citation omitted). 
An abuse of discretion is a "clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment - one that is 
clearly against the logic and the effect of [the] facts . . . or against the reasonable and 
probable deductions to be drawn from the facts." Becker v. Sunset City, 2009 UT App 
197, Tf 10, 216 P.3d 367 (citation omitted). This issue was raised below. See 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, at pp. 10-11 [R. 4830-31]; Transcript of 
Motion Hearing ("Transcript"), at p. 47-48, 69 [R. 8538].
 { 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (2010)1 is the only determinative statute: 
"The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time 
of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance i 
which may have attached subsequently to the time when the building, improvement or 
structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground ... ." 
i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal arising out of a mechanic's lien foreclosure action concerning a 
half-finished, mixed use development of three seven-story buildings located at 320 South 
State Street in Orem, Utah, and known as Midtown Village. An aerial photograph of the 
site as it appeared on July 11, 2005 is included in the addendum hereto at Tab B (the 
photograph is not part of the record and is provided for the Court's convenience, not for 
evidentiary purposes). Appellant United Western Bank ("UWB") is the successor by 
assignment of Marshall Investments Corporation and BankFirst, the banks that provided a 
total of $62,000,000 of financing (the "Loan") for the construction of Midtown Village. 
1
 The language of this statute has been the same as the present version at all times 
relevant to the above-captioned appeal. A copy of the statute is included in the 
addendum hereto at Tab A. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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UWB, Marshall Investments Corporation and BankFirst are referred to herein 
collectively as "UWB." 
The plaintiffs/appellees (collectively, the "Lien Claimants") are contractors who 
provided materials and services in connection with the construction of Midtown Village, 
and who claim mechanic's liens against Midtown Village as a result. Together they 
received approximately $57,000,000 of the proceeds of the Loan. Big-D Construction 
Corporation ("Big-D") was the general contractor. Big-D subcontracted with many, but 
not all, of the other Lien Claimants. Some of the Lien Claimants contracted directly with 
either Midtown Joint Venture, L.C. ("Midtown JV"), the current owner of Midtown 
Village, or prior owners of Midtown Village. 
Midtown Village was the brain-child of developer Lawrence J. Myler ("Myler"). 
Myler owns Midtown Village, LLC ("Midtown LLC"), which in turn owns 25 percent of 
Midtown JV. Midtown LLC is the manager of Midtown JV. The remaining 75 percent 
of Midtown JV is indirectly owned and controlled by Phoenix, Arizona-based 
businessman, Jerry C. Moyes ("Moyes"). 
The Lien Claimants continued to work on Midtown Village after the cost of their 
work exceeded the available proceeds of the Loan; the Lien Claimants claim they are 
owed over $25,000,000 more than they have already been paid. The Lien Claimants 
contend that because some excavation work occurred nine or ten months before the 
Construction Deed of Trust, Absolute Assignment of Rents and Security Agreement and 
Fixture Filing (the "Deed of Trust") that secures the Loan was recorded, their alleged 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mechanics5 liens relate back to that excavation work and have priority over the Deed of 
Trust. 
I 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Construction work on Midtown Village ground to a halt in early 2008 after 
Midtown JV borrowed the entire amount of the Loan from UWB and exhausted all other 
sources from which it could pay the Lien Claimants. The Lien Claimants recorded their 
mechanic's lien notices in the office of the Utah County Recorder and then began filing i 
lien foreclosure suits, individually or in groups, during the summer and fall of 2008. The 
various suits were subsequently consolidated with the first-filed case, which was 
i 
commenced in May 2008 by mechanic's lien claimant Tim Risinger d/b/a Marathon 
Triads Carpet Mill Outlet (District Court Case No. 080401531). 
Big-D and a number of other Lien Claimants filed a Motion for Partial Summary { 
Judgment on April 9, 2009 (the "Motion for Summary Judgment"). See Motion for 
Summary Judgment [R. 1360-66]. The motion was later joined by the other Lien 
Claimants. See various notices of joinder [R. 2115-19, 2220-29, 2440-46, 3221-25, 
4208-16, 4609-16],. By their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Lien Claimants sought 
a determination that their alleged mechanic's liens, if valid and enforceable, have priority 
over UWB's Deed of Trust. More specifically, the Lien Claimants sought an order 
"stating that: [ujnder the Utah Mechanics' Liens [sic] Statute, visible commencement of 
work took place . . . on or about September 10, 2003 and continued through February of 
2008. All trust deed filings by the Lender Defendants occurred more than one year and 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
eight months thereafter in June 2005 and continuing thereafter." See Motion for 
Summary Judgment [R. 1360-66]. 
The parties proceeded with the discovery necessary for UWB to respond to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. UWB filed its memorandum in opposition to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment on July 31, 2009. See Opposition Memo [R. 4976-5059]. UWB 
moved concurrently to strike certain evidence offered by the Lien Claimants in support of 
their motion. See Motion to Strike [R. 4814-19]. In particular, among other things, 
UWB moved the District Court to strike the Lien Claimants' references to and evidence 
of UWB's having title insurance. See id. 
Following the completion of briefing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
District Court heard oral argument on April 23, 2010. At the close of the argument the 
District Court orally announced its decision to grant the motion. The District Court 
determined that, because it was undisputed that excavation occurred on the Midtown 
Village site starting in late 2004, "as a matter of law the commencement of work did 
occur in the fall 2004 timeframe." See Transcript, at p. 64 [R. 8538]. The District Court 
went on to conclude that all of the work performed on Midtown Village was part of a 
single project, with a common plan that was not materially abandoned. See id., at pp. 64-
70 [R. 8538]. Finally, while not explicitly addressing UWB's Motion to Strike, the 
District Court indicated that it was "discarding" the evidence UWB had moved to strike, 
with the exception of the Lien Claimants' evidence concerning title insurance. See id., at 
p. 69 [R. 8538]. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On June 16, 2010, the District Court signed the Lien Claimants' proposed order 
granting their motion for partial summary judgment (as well as orders overruling UWB's 
objections and denying UWB's Motion to Strike). See Order Overruling Objection to 
Proposed Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [R. 7829-32]; Order 
[R. 7819-28]. On June 22, 2010, the District Court entered a Corrected Order and an 
Order denying UWB's Motion to Strike. See Corrected Order [R. 7848-57]; Order [R. 
7845-47]. True and correct copies of the Corrected Order and Order are included in the 
addendum hereto at Tabs C and D. 
UWB sought permission to appeal on July 7, 2010. See Notice of Defendants' 
Filing of Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Orders [R. 7999-8000], 
The Utah Supreme Court granted UWB's petition and transferred the appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals on August 6, 2010. See Order [R. 8344]. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As the following facts show, the development of Midtown Village proceeded as 
three distinct projects. First, an Icon Building was constructed to notify the public that 
development was underway and to serve as the sales office for Midtown Village. The 
second project, excavation in the areas of what became known as the South Tower and 
the North Tower of Midtown Village, began about four months after the Icon Building 
was completed. Then, approximately nine months after the excavation work concluded, 
the third project - actual construction of the South Tower - began after Midtown JV 
secured the Loan from UWB and obtained a building permit to construct the South 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tower. An illustrative timeline showing key dates, events and parties is included in the 
addendum hereto at Tab E. 
A. The Icon Building 
Midtown Village was a haphazard development from the very beginning. The 
property on which Midtown Village is now located used to be a mobile home park. See 
Declaration of Mark J. Snyder ("Snyder Deck"), f 5 [R. 4971]; Deposition of Lawrence 
John Myler ("Myler Depo."), 15:6-17 [R. 5059(A)]. Myler's company, Western Oasis 
Properties, LC ("Western Oasis"), acquired various contiguous parcels of land, including 
the mobile home park, through several transactions beginning in 2002. See Snyder Deck, 
f t 5, 10-12 [R. 4969-70]; Myler Depo., 153:16-154:20 [R. 5059(A)]. When Western 
Oasis initially purchased the land it intended simply to hold it; Western Oasis changed its 
plans and began planning for a mixed-use development when an Orem City official 
expressed a preference for such a development on the land. Myler Depo., 15:18-16:18 
[R. 5059(A)]. 
On August 6, 2003, Tower Development Services, Inc. ("Tower Development"), 
which is owned by Myler, contracted with Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company 
("Ellsworth Paulsen") to build the Icon Building. See Standard Form of Agreement 
Between Owner and Contractor, Deposition Exhibit 4 [R. 5059(A)]; Myler Depo., 154:5-
25, 162:7-163:10 [R. 5059(A)]. Tower Development intended the Icon Building to be 
used as a sales office for selling condominium units in Midtown Village. See Deposition 
of Brett Harris ("Harris Depo."), 58:5-15, 75:8-16 [R. 5059(A)]. Tower Development 
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separately contracted with Ken Harris Architect, Inc. ("KH Architect") for the design of 
Icon Building. See id., 153:8-23 [R. 5059(A)]. 
The City of Orem issued a building permit for the Icon Building to "Midtown 
Village/Larry Myler" on June 13, 2003. See Declaration of Tamara Beardall ("Beardall 
DecL"), % 4 [R. 4891, 4900]. Ellsworth Paulsen recorded a notice of commencement for 
the "Midton [sic] ICON Building" on September 10, 2003. See Deposition of Allen 
Washburn ("Washburn Depo."), 74:18-75:16 [R. 5059(A)]; Notice of Commencement, < 
Deposition Exhibit 12 [R. 5059(A)]. In December 2003, Western Oasis conveyed to 
Tower Development the approximately one-half acre parcel on which the Icon Building 
was constructed. See Snyder DecL, «[f 8 [R. 4953, 4970]. Since that time the half-acre 
Icon Building parcel has always had a different tax serial number than the rest of the 
Midtown Village property. See id., «]j 7 [R. 4971]; Myler Depo., 161:21-25 [R. 5059(A)]. { 
Construction of the Icon Building was completed in April or May 2004. See Affidavit of 
Allen Washburn ("Washburn Aff"), ^5 [R. 1613]. Tower Development paid for 
construction of the Icon Building with Myler's personal resources and a construction loan 
from a company called Millenia Investment Corporation. See Myler Depo., 68:1-5, 
161:9-20 [R. 5059(A)]. Allen Washburn ("Washburn"), Ellsworth Paulsen's project 
manager assigned to Midtown Village (and later, Big-D5s project manager), considers the 
Icon Building to be "separate" from the rest of what became Midtown Village. See 
Washburn Depo., 25:20-26:1 [R. 5059(A)]. 
Tower Development lacked the financial resources to develop Midtown Village 
beyond construction of the Icon Building. Myler explained the rationale for proceeding 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the Icon Building alone as follows: "[w]e didn't have funding for the entire project, 
so we did have the money to build this one Icon Building. Let's build it, and that could 
keep interest in the community high and confidence up in the project." See Myler Depo., 
160:7-161:8 [R. 5059(A)]. Despite a lack of funding, on May 5, 2004, Tower 
Development entered into a second contract with Ellsworth Paulsen, this time for the 
design and construction of Midtown Village. See Myler Depo., 72:20-73:20 [R. 
5059(A)]; Standard Form of Design-Build Agreement and General Conditions Between 
Owner and Design-Builder, Deposition Exhibit 18 [R. 5059(A)]. Tower Development's 
second contract with Ellsworth Paulsen required Ellsworth Paulsen to perform the 
excavation work for Midtown Village and obligated Tower Development to obtain 
financing for the construction as a condition precedent to Ellsworth Paulsen's obligation 
to commence work. See Standard Form of Design-Build Agreement and General 
Conditions Between Owner and Design-Builder, Deposition Exhibit 18 [R. 5059(A)]. 
The second contract incorporated some drawings of Midtown Village and required 
Ellsworth Paulsen to provide actual construction plans for Tower Development's 
approval. See id. 
B. Excavation 
On September 13, 2004, the City of Orem authorized excavation of the Midtown 
Village site. See Beardall Deck, If 5 [R. 4889, 4899-4900]. On September 23, 2004 - at 
least four months after the Icon Building was completed and despite Tower 
Development's having previously contracted with Ellsworth Paulsen to perform the work 
- Myler directly contracted with Reynolds Brothers, Inc. ("Reynolds Brothers") to 
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excavate a large pit that is approximately 22 feet deep, 400 feet long and 170 feet wide on 
the Midtown Village site. See Myler Depo., 150:15-24 [R. 5059(A)]; letter agreement < 
between Myler and Reynolds Brothers, Deposition Exhibit 62 [R. 5059(A)]. Myler 
wanted to proceed with excavation at that time, despite the fact that he still lacked the 
i 
funding necessary to build Midtown Village, for at least three reasons. First, Myler 
wanted to "beat the weather." See Myler Depo., 150:15-24 [R. 5059(A)]. Second, 
Reynolds Brothers gave Myler a reduced price for the excavation work because Reynolds ( 
Brothers was able to sell the excavated dirt and, third, Myler wanted to show the public 
that progress was being made. See id., 150:15-152:14 [R. 5059(A)]. Reynolds Brothers 
loaned part of the cost of its excavation work to Myler on six- and twelve-month credit 
terms. See letter agreement between Myler and Reynolds Brothers, Deposition Exhibit 
62 [R. 5059(A)]. On September 10, 2004, Western Oasis borrowed an additional 
$562,000 from Marshall Bank, N.A., which was also used in part to pay for the 
excavation. See Myler Depo. 27:9-28:5 [R. 5059(A)]; Promissory Note, Deposition 
Exhibit 153 [R. 5059(A)]. 
Then, on October 10, 2004, Tower Development contracted with Ralph L. 
Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. ("Wadsworth Construction") to perform shoring 
work on the southern portion of the excavated pit. See Deposition of Tod Wadsworth 
("Wadsworth Depo.'5), 18:1-9 [R. 5059(A)]; Standard Form of Agreement Between 
Owner and Trade Contractor, Deposition Exhibit 129 [R. 5059(A)]. Wadsworth 
Construction's work consisted of applying soil nails and gunite to certain areas of the 
sides of the excavaited pit during the course of the excavation work to provide lateral 
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support to neighboring property and to protect people working in the pit. See Wadsworth 
Depo., 34:4-36:17 [R. 5059(A)]. The shoring work did not provide any support for the 
subsequently constructed building, nor was it intended to. See Deposition of Brett A. 
DiBernardi ("DiBernardi Depo."), 54:7-55:3 [R. 5059(A)]; Wadsworth Depo., 36:13-17 
[R. 5059(A)]. 
Reynolds Brothers began excavation work on the Midtown Village site on or 
about September 24, 2004, and continued until January 5, 2005. See Deposition of Gary 
Reynolds ("Reynolds Depo."), 53:20-55:9, 65:15-66:15, 110:5-111:25, 123:17-124:3 [R. 
5059(A)]; Washburn Depo. 66:1-23 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Aff., 1 7 [R. 1613]. No 
further work was performed on the Midtown Village site until October or November 
2005 - nine or ten months later - after Tower Development obtained a building permit. 
See Myler Depo., 178:23-181:6, 189:24-192:2 [R. 5059(A)]; Declaration of Jim Krumm 
("Krumm Deck"), 11 8-12 [R. 4864-65]; Beardall Deck, H 7, 9 [R. 4898-99]. 
There was no dispute in the District Court about the fact that Tower Development 
lacked the financial means to proceed with construction of Midtown Village when 
excavation ceased in early 2005. See Myler Depo., 178:13-25 [R. 5059(A)]. Indeed, 
Myler answered a question about financing posed by counsel for Big-D as follows: 
Q. I'm about done. But summarizing the - the things that put the 
project on hold between when the excavation and the shoring work 
was completed and when the work resumed again, did it consist of 
one principal problem but a couple other issues? The principal 
problem was getting the financing package finished? Was that the 
major issue on continuing forward? 
A. That was the do-or-die issue, yeah. 
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Myler Depo., 126:21-127:6 [R. 5059(A)]. A lack of funding was not the only reason for 
the cessation of work, however. Tower Development was incapable of proceeding with 
the construction of Midtown Village in early 2005 because: 
• Tower Development did not have a building permit (and did not obtain a building 
permit until October 7, 2005). See Beardall Deck, ffif 9-10 [R. 4878, 4898]. 
• Tower Development's general contractor, Ellsworth Paulsen, did not have 
sufficient bonding capacity to construct Midtown Village. See Washburn Depo., 
19:23-20:5 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Aff., 1119 [R. 1611]; Myler Depo., 89:21-
90:19, 172:21-173:1 [R. 5059(A)]. 
• The plans were in a constant state of flux and there were no sufficiently complete 
plans to construct the South Tower (or any other part of Midtown Village). See 
letter to KH Architects, dated January 18, 2005, Deposition Exhibit 101 [R. 
5059(A)]; Wadsworth Depo., 37:22-39:17 [R. 5059(A)]; Harris Depo. 176:1-15 
[R. 5059(A)]. The plans were still "incomplete . . . or non-exist[ent]" some eight 
months later. See Washburn Depo., 143:13-144:8 [R. 5059(A)]; letter from 
Robert S. Moore dated August 18, 2005, Deposition Exhibit 21 [R. 5059(A)]. 
In Myler's own words, the net result of the lack of funding, the lack of a building permit, 
the lack of complete plans and Ellsworth Paulsen's inability to build Midtown Village 
was that "[w]e sat for a long time with our hole." Myler Depo., 113:13-20 (emphasis 
added) [R. 5059(A)]. 
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C. Construction 
i. The Plans for Midtown Village Changed Repeatedly 
Before construction of Midtown Village could begin, the plans for the South 
Tower had to be completed. Revisions to the plans went on until at least October 2005, 
almost four months after the Deed of Trust was recorded. See Beardall Dec!., 1f1f 8-10 [R. 
4878, 4898]. As originally conceived, Midtown Village was to consist of the separate 
Icon Building and four connected towers configured in the shape of a capital "E." See 
MylerDepo., 159:3-160:6 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Depo., 37:16-38:10, 116:11-117:18 
[R. 5059(A)]; First Level Floor Plan, Deposition Exhibit 2 [R. 5059(A)]; Sheet S106.1b, 
Deposition Exhibit 20 [R. 5059(A)]. The towers were originally intended to have four 
stories, but increased to seven when it became apparent that the development needed 
additional floors in order to be economically feasible. See Myler Depo., 20:2-21:18 [R. 
5059(A)]. The southernmost tower was abandoned during the conceptual design phase 
so that Midtown Village became a U-shaped, three-tower development. See id. The 
towers came to be known as the South Tower, North Tower and West Tower. 
In addition to eliminating the southernmost tower, the plans for Midtown Village 
were also changed to decrease the size of the West Tower by 20 percent. See Washburn 
Depo., 136:10-137:25 [R. 5059(A)]; August 23, 2005 letter agreement, Deposition 
Exhibit 21 [R. 5059(A)]. The plans were also changed to move the mechanical systems 
for the towers from the roof to a central underground boiler/chiller plant located between 
the towers (the "Central Plant"). See Harris Depo., 88:18-91:3 [R. 5059(A)]. The 
addition of the Central Plant necessitated further excavation work. See Myler Depo., 
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133:10-134:14 [R. 5059(A)]. The size of the Central Plant was subsequently reduced by 
approximately 2,000 square feet. See August 23, 2005 letter agreement, Deposition { 
Exhibit 21 [R. 5059(A)]; Meeting Report, Deposition Exhibit 49 [R. 5059(A)]; Harris 
Depo. 87:2-20, 143:19-144:6 [R. 5059(A)]. This change in square footage resulted in a 
( 
$500,000 construction cost reduction. See August 23, 2005 letter agreement, Deposition 
Exhibit 21 [R. 5059(A)]. 
The appearance of Midtown Village changed significantly over time as the plans { 
were revised. For example: 
• During the fall of 2005, Myler decided to eliminate part of a breezeway and 
thereby add leasable square footage to Midtown Village. See Harris Depo., 
135:10-137:22 [R. 5059(A)]. 
i 
• In or about January 2004 open-air atriums within the towers were eliminated in 
favor of closed roofs. See Washburn Depo., 169:6-170:13 [R. 5059(A)]; Harris 
Depo., 92:21-95:7 [R. 5059(A)]. , 
• In 2006, a storm-water detention pond, which was originally planned to be located 
west of Orem Boulevard to the west of the West Tower, was moved to the second 
level of the South Tower underground parking structure. See Meeting Minutes 
dated September 28, 2005, Deposition Exhibit 32 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Depo., 
34:8-36:20, 171:13-172:16 [R. 5059(A)]; Harris Depo., 43:7-44:19 [R. 5059(A)]. 
• A parking area and park were eliminated from the site plan. See Harris Depo., 
41:12-25, 42:24-43:17 [R. 5059(A)]. 
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• The West Tower was "initially designed to have one level of parking underneath 
the building, with a level of parking underneath the parking area to the West/' but 
the design was changed to include two levels of parking underneath the building. 
See Harris Depo., 26:12-29:16 [R. 5059(A)]. 
• The internal layouts of the towers changed. Hallways were eliminated to increase 
the size of condominium units and several stairways and elevator access points 
were added. See Washburn Depo., 174:24-175:13 [R. 5059(A)]; Harris Depo., 
36:8-37:7, 39:5-40:11, 95:25-98:5, 208:15-209:2 [R. 5059(A)]. 
• While the original plans for Midtown Village called for an asphalt shingle roof, 
the plans were changed to require a much more expensive metal and composite 
shingle roof. See Washburn Depo., 141:5-142:7 [R. 5059(A)]. 
• Vinyl windows were replaced with wood windows. See Washburn Depo., 141:5-
142:23 [R. 5059(A)]. 
•
 u[F]ield changes [were] made to much of the roof design . . . [because] [t]he 
drawing details were not put together accurately." Washburn Depo., 41:23-42:10 
[R. 5059(A)]; see also Harris Depo., 73:5-74:5 [R. 5059(A)]. 
Summing up the foregoing changes and others, Myler observed that "[t]he outer look 
and design and architecture of the building evolved. It was more of a constant thing, 
rather than a one-time change. The number of units, of course, changed over time." 
See Myler Depo., 20:13-21:12 [R. 5059(A)]. Washburn similarly testified that change 
was constant: 
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Q. What do you mean by it was finalized several times? 
A. Everything was final until they changed it. < 
Q. On the atrium on the West Tower? 
A. Atrium, carpet styles, anything that could be changed without starting from 
the ground up was vulnerable. ( 
Washburn Depo., 170:6-13 [R. 5059(A)]. The significance of the changes to the plans 
for Midtown Village is reflected in the fact that the budget for the development increased 
( 
by approximately 50 percent from an initial $59,000,000 to almost $90,000,000. See 
Washburn Depo., 185:9-186:2 [R. 5059(A)]; Transcript, at p. 67 ("It sounds like the 
project started out at 55 million, has now increased another 30 percent, something like ( 
t h a t . . . . ")[R. 8538]. 
Whether the plans for Midtown Village changed significantly over time was 
contested in the District Court. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts, f^ 2 [R. 1658]; Opposition Memo, at pp. ix-xxi 
[R. 5039-51]. For example, Washburn, the project manager for Ellsworth Paulsen and 
later the project manager for Big-D, submitted a sworn affidavit in support of the Lien 
Claimants' Motion for Summary Judgment wherein he averred that "[t]he scope of work i 
has always had the same general footprint for the buildings of the Project." See 
Washburn Aff, ^ 3 [R. 1614]. But at his subsequent deposition, Washburn recanted his 
i 
affidavit testimony on this point. See Washburn Depo., 33:24-34:7 [R. 5059(A)]. 
Similarly, the parties disputed the consistency of the layout of Midtown Village. 
As noted, Midtown Village was at one time intended to consist of the Icon Building and 
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four connected towers configured in the shape of a capital "E." See Myler Depo., 159:3-
160:6 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Depo., 37:16-38:10, 116:11-117:18 [R. 5059(A)]; First 
Level Floor Plan, Deposition Exhibit 2 [R. 5059(A)]; Sheet S106.1b, Deposition Exhibit 
20 [R. 5059(A)]. According to the Lien Claimants, however, cc[t]he Project has always 
been a mixed use project with a Main Building situated in a CU' shape . . . ." See Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs5 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at p. 8 [R. 
5500]. 
ii. Midtown JV Secures Financing 
Myler first sought construction financing for Midtown Village from UWB in early 
2004. See Myler Depo., 25:8-18 [R. 5059(A)]. On September 1, 2004, Marshall Bank, 
N.A., an affiliate of UWB's predecessor, expressed interest in financing the development 
of Midtown Village and offered to loan Myler approximately $600,000 for "pre-
development costs." See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Exhibit "I," letter to Myler from Marshall Bank, N.A. president Erik Moe [R. 
1544-46]. Myler accepted Marshall Bank, N.A.'s offer and Marshall Bank, N.A. loaned 
$562,000 to Western Oasis on September 10, 2004. See Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit "J," Promissory Note [R. 1538-42]. 
Myler used the proceeds of the loan, in part, to pay for Reynolds Brothers excavation 
work in late 2004. See Myler Depo., 27:9-17 [R. 5059(A)]. 
Myler and his companies continued to seek construction financing from UWB 
through the remainder of 2004 and into 2005. See Myler Depo., 23:9-25:3 [R. 5059(A)]. 
Jim Krumm ("Krumm"), a representative of UWB, visited the Midtown Village site in 
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March or April 2005, following the completion of the mass excavation work. See id., 
60:16-62:10 [R. 5059(A)]; see also Krumm Deck, f 8 [R. 4865]. During his visit he
 ( 
observed cca large, rectangular excavated area, the long axis of which ran west from State 
Street." Krumm Deck, <]} 9 [R. 4865]. Due to the size of the construction loan Myler 
i 
sought, UWB required that the loan under discussion be guaranteed. Myler proposed that 
Dan Christensen be the guarantor. See Myler Depo., 24:7-22, 143:12-25 [R. 5059(A)]. 
In late 2004, however, Marshall Bank refused to accept him as a guarantor and informed { 
Myler that the Midtown Village project "isn't going to work." See id., 23:16-24:6, 118:4-
119:3, 143:12-147:12 [R. 5059(A)]. It then became obvious to Myler that "unless [he] 
did something substantially different than what [he] had been planning on doing, [Tower 
Development] would not have a project." See id., 118:4-119:3 [R. 5059(A)]. In fact, 
when he learned that Mr. Christensen was not an acceptable guarantor, Myler believed 
there was a possibility that Midtown Village was dead. See id., 146:9-15 [R. 5059(A)]. 
There were days when Myler had "serious doubts" about whether Midtown Village , 
would work. See id., 147:9-12 [R. 5059(A)]. Ellsworth Paulsen knew that Tower 
Development's funding had fallen through. See Washburn Aff, ^ 15 [R. 1612]. 
In December 2004, when the excavation was nearly complete, Myler found a new 
guarantor: Moyes. See Myler Depo., 144:18-148:11 [R. 5059(A)]. On April 6, 2005, 
Midtown LLC teamed up with Moyes to form Midtown JV for the purpose of developing 
Midtown Village. See id., 23:16-24:6, 155:3-156:20 [R. 5059(A)]. Myler's company, 
Midtown LLC, owned 25 percent of Midtown JV, while Moyes' company owned the 
remaining 75 percent. See id., 155:3-157:10 [R. 5059(A)]. 
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Once Midtown JV was formed it obtained the Loan to construct Midtown Village. 
See Myler Depo., 126:13-20, 148:9-149:7 [R. 5059(A)]. The Loan to Midtown JV closed 
on or about June 17, 2005. See id., 62:19-63:19 [R. 5059(A)]. As security for the 
$42,000,000 Loan, Myler signed the Deed of Trust on behalf of Midtown JV. See id., 
63:12-19, 179:11-13 [R. 5059(A)]; Construction Deed of Trust, Absolute Assignment of 
Rents and Security Agreement and Fixture Filing, Deposition Exhibit 161 [R. 5059(A)]. 
The Deed of Trust was recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder on June 17, 
2005. See id. On the same day, Ellsworth Paulsen submitted an invoice to Myler 
describing its work on Midtown Village to that point as "Pre-Construction and 
Mobilization Services.55 See Washburn Depo., 79:14-80:25 [R. 5059(A)]; Invoice dated 
June 17, 2005, Deposition Exhibit 16 [R. 5059(A)]. Midtown JV used some of the 
proceeds of the Loan to pay Ellsworth Paulsen's invoice. See Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts, ff[ 51-52 [R. 1648]. 
The property on which Midtown Village was to be built was conveyed no fewer 
than four times and owned by at least three different entities during the period leading up 
to June 17, 2005. First, Tower Development and Western Oasis conveyed the property to 
Tower Development on January 31, 2005. See Snyder DecL, f15 [R. 4929-30, 4969]. 
Second, Tower Development conveyed the property to Midtown JV on April 8, 2005, 
although the Warranty Deed was not recorded until moments before the Deed of Trust. 
See id., % 18 [R. 4920-21, 4968]. Tower Development conveyed the property to Western 
Oasis on June 17, 2005. See id., f 16 [R. 4926-27, 4968-69]. Finally, Western Oasis 
conveyed the property back to Tower Development on the same day. See id., f^ 17 [R. 
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4923-24,4968]. 
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment the Lien Claimants offered < 
evidence of Marshall Investments Corporation's acquisition of title insurance in 
connection with the Loan. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
( 
Judgment, Statement of Facts, ffi[ 43, 59 [R. 1646, 1650]. UWB moved to strike this 
evidence and all references to title insurance found in the Lien Claimants' argument 
pursuant to Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Motion to Strike, at p. 4 [R. { 
4816]. The District Court denied the Lien Claimants' Motion to Strike evidence of title 
insurance. See Transcript, at pp. 69-70 [R. 8538]; Order [R. 7829-31]; Order [R. 7845-
47]. 
iii. Construction of a Structure Begins 
i 
Ten days after the Deed of Trust was recorded the Deseret News published an 
article entitled "Orem Midtown hole, lot of hope: Why no action? Depends on who's 
asked - but little worry is visible." See Declaration of Susan Moore ("Moore Deck"), f^ 7 , 
[R. 4843-44, 4857]. Noting that "work crews are still waiting for the cgo ahead' to start 
work on the project," the author of the article posed and purported to answer two 
i 
questions: "why is the giant hole on State Street in Orem, where a developer says he's 
going to build a Gateway-esque shopping and living center, still just that - a giant hole?" 
and "[w]hat's causing the delay?" See id. The author quoted Ellsworth Paulsen's CEO, 
John Park, saying that "[w]e'll be ready to start construction as soon as the permits have 
been issued." See id. 
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Mr. Park's optimism notwithstanding, Ellsworth Paulsen lacked the bonding 
capacity necessary to undertake the construction of Midtown Village alone. See 
Washburn Depo., 19:23-20:5 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Aff, 1J19 [R. 1611]; Myler Depo., 
89:21-90:19, 172:21-173:1 [R. 5059(A)]. As a result, Ellsworth Paulsen formed a joint 
venture with Bud Bailey Construction Company ("Bud Bailey"). See Washburn Aff., f^ 
20 [R. 1611]; letter to Myler dated April 8, 2005, Deposition Exhibit 19 [R. 5059(A)]. 
On April 25, 2005, the Ellsworth Paulsen/ Bud Bailey joint venture then contracted with 
Tower Development to construct Midtown Village for a guaranteed maximum price of 
$59,566,001. See Washburn Aff, ffif 20-21 [R. 1611]; Standard Form of Agreement 
Between Owner and Contractor, Deposition Exhibit 19 [R. 5059(A)]. 
Bud Bailey's involvement in Midtown Village was short-lived. Bud Bailey was 
sold by its parent company soon after forming its joint venture with Ellsworth Paulsen. 
See Myler Depo., 90:20-91:24 [R. 5059(A)]. Bud Bailey's new owner did not want to 
remain involved with Midtown Village. See id.; see also Washburn Aff., f 22 [R. 1611]. 
Myler consequently sought a new general contractor to partner with Ellsworth Paulsen. 
See Myler Depo., 90:20-91:24 [R. 5059(A)]. After a few months, Myler selected Big-D. 
See Washburn Aff., ffif 23-24 [R. 1611]. Big-D's contract proposal to Midtown JV was 
accompanied by a cover letter, dated August 18, 2005. The letter pointed out the fact that 
the proposed contract did not reference "[d]rawings and specifications" for Midtown 
Village "due to the incomplete nature or non-existence of drawings and specifications." 
See letter from Robert S. Moore to Myler, Deposition Exhibit 21 [R. 5059(A)]. The letter 
went on to instruct Myler that he should "direct architect and engineers to design 
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i 
[Midtown Village] in strict accordance with the enclosed [guaranteed maximum price] 
and contract documents/5 Id. I 
Like Bud Bailey before it, Big-D formed a joint venture with Ellsworth Paulsen 
and on August 23, 2005, two months after the Deed of Trust was recorded, the Big-
D/Ellsworth Paulsen joint venture contracted with Midtown JV to build Midtown Village 
for a guaranteed maximum price of $59,566,001. See Standard Form of Agreement 
Between Owner and Contractor, Deposition Exhibit 21 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Aff., fflf 
24, 26 [R. 1610-11]. Ellsworth Paulsen later withdrew from the joint venture due to its 
own bonding problems, leaving Big-D as the sole general contractor. See Myler Depo., 
92:3-10 [R. 5059(A)]. 
In the construction contracts between Tower Development and the Bud 
Bailey/Ellsworth Paulsen joint venture, dated April 25, 2005, and between the Big-
D/Ellsworth Paulsen joint venture and Midtown JV, dated August 23, 2005, the parties all 
agreed that the date of commencement for the work to be performed pursuant to the 
contracts would be as follows: 
Date of commencement shall be upon receipt of necessary building 
permits, constructible complete drawings and notice to proceed. . . . The 
date of commencement however shall not be valid until such time as 
Owner has provided contractor reasonable evidence that financial 
arrangements have been made to fulfill Owner's payment obligations under 
the Agreement. 
See Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, §4.1.1, Deposition 
Exhibit 19 [R. 5059(A)]; Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, § 
4.1.1, Deposition Exhibit 21 [R. 5059(A)]. 
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The City of Orem issued a building permit (titled a 'Temporary Permit") to Tower 
Development on October 7, 2005. See Beardail DecL, ffif 9-10 [R. 4878, 4898]. The 
permit authorized construction of the underground parking structure only. See id. A full 
set of plans for the South Tower was eventually submitted to the City on November 3, 
2005 (five months after the Deed of Trust was recorded), and a full building permit for 
the above-ground portion of the South Tower was issued on February 13, 2006 (eight 
months after the Deed of Trust was recorded). See id., t 11 [R- 4876, 4897]. The City 
later issued a temporary footing, foundation and underground building permit to 'Tower 
Develop" for the North Tower on March 7, 2006. See id., If 13 [R. 4872, 4897]. 
The Big-D/Ellsworth Paulsen joint venture filed a Notice of Commencement for 
the "Parking Structure-Midtown Village" in the online State Construction Registry on 
October 11, 2005. See SCR Notice of Commencement #15576, Deposition Exhibit 29 
[R. 5059(A)]; Moore DecL, % 4 [R. 4851-53, 4858]. Reynolds Brothers then commenced 
excavation of spot footings for the South Tower in late October or November 2005. See 
Reynolds Depo., 90:3-91:24 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Depo., 132:23-134:15 [R. 
5059(A)]. Footings are "[structural varying elements that the rest of the building 
depends on to remain stable." See Washburn Depo., 118:12-14 [R. 5059(A)]. A footing 
"bears the structure on the soil"; in other words a footing bears the weight of the 
foundation wall and the initial structure and "transfers that weight into the soil." See 
Harris Depo., 52:15-22 [R. 5059(A)]. The footings become part of the building whose 
weight they are to bear. See Reynolds Depo., 47:12-48:7 [R. 5059(A)]; Declaration of 
John Despain ("Despain DecL"), H 13 .[R. 4914]. The footings for the South Tower and 
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the North Tower were 24-inch thick concrete mats that were thickened in places with spot 
footing pads that would underlie the structural columns and elevators. See Washburn 
Depo., 118:15-119:6 [R. 5059(A)]; Harris Depo., 99:15-100:4 [R. 5059(A)]. After the 
spot footings were excavated in October or November 2005, Reynolds Brothers imported 
. and placed the structural fill (i.e., gravel) necessary for construction of the mat footing. 
. See Reynolds Depo., 94:1-95:8, 129:1-130:7 [R. 5059(A)]; Reynolds Brothers Truck 
Tickets, Deposition Exhibit 86 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Depo., 135:5-22, 157:7-14 [R. 
5059(A)]. Construction of the South Tower parking structure then proceeded. 
In March 2007, the Loan was revised. UWB made an additional $20,000,000 
advance in order to pay the Lien Claimants, thus bringing the total amount of the Loan to 
$62,000,000. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Statement of Facts, If 58 [R. 1646]. Midtown JV paid approximately $57,000,000 of the 
Loan proceeds to the Lien Claimants. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court erred in two ways. First, the District Court incorrectly 
determined that the material facts were undisputed, when there were numerous disputed 
issues of material fact. Second, the District Court applied the wrong legal tests for the 
commencement of construction and the relation back of mechanic's liens. These errors 
resulted in the District Court's incorrect determination that construction of Midtown 
Village commenced when Reynolds Brothers performed excavation work in September 
2004, prior to the date on which the Deed of Trust was recorded, and that the Lien 
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Claimants5 alleged mechanic's liens relate back to that excavation work such that their 
alleged mechanic's liens have priority over the Deed of Trust. 
Utah's courts have traditionally applied a case-by-case test for the commencement 
of construction under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5. While moving dirt by grading or 
grubbing land does not amount to commencement, moving an ill-defmed quantity of 
additional dirt in order to bury irrigation pipe, for example, could constitute 
commencement. This quantitative standard is unworkable and requires further 
refinement. Section 38-1-5 mandates a qualitative test: the statute provides for 
mechanic's liens to have priority as of "the time of the commencement to do work or 
furnish materials on the grounder the structure or improvement" Moving dirt, 
regardless of the quantity involved, merely prepares the site for subsequent construction; 
it is not work "for [a] structure or improvement." Commencement occurs only when 
visible work is performed specifically for the contemplated structure or improvement. 
Thus, in the typical case of a building, commencement occurs when the concrete footings 
or foundation are poured. Utah's commencement standard should be refined to be a 
bright-line standard derived from the statute. 
The District Court applied the wrong commencement standard by ruling that the 
excavation of a massive pit amounted to commencement. As the pit was excavated 
before the Deed of Trust was recorded, the District Court concluded, the Lien Claimants' 
alleged mechanic's liens have priority over the Deed of Trust. If the District Court had 
applied the appropriate standard - that commencement occurs at the time of work "for the 
structure or improvement" - it would have reached the opposite conclusion because the 
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footings for Midtown Village were not poured until several months after the Deed of 
Trust was recorded. < 
The District Court also erred by ruling that the Lien Claimants' alleged 
mechanic's liens relate back to excavation work performed before the Deed of Trust was 
recorded, even though no work was performed on-site during the nine-month period 
between the end of the excavation work in early January 2005, and actual construction in 
October 2005. The District Court incorrectly applied each of the four parts of the relation 
back test set forth in Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
First, the District Court ruled that Midtown Village was a single project. In fact, 
Midtown Village was built as three distinct projects: the Icon Building; excavation; and 
construction of the South and North Towers. Each of these projects was undertaken by 
different parties pursuant to different contracts and for different purposes. Each project 
was separately financed. And each project was separated from the next by months-long 
periods of total inactivity on the site. Work on Midtown Village did not progress 
smoothly from one task to the next as it would in the case of a single, unified project; 
rather, separate pieces of work were undertaken only as and when the money to pay for 
them happened to become available. If UWB had not made the Loan, Midtown Village 
would most likely still be nothing more than a massive pit. At the very least, because 
reasonable persons could easily disagree about whether the facts reflected either a single 
project or multiple projects, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
Second, even assuming that Midtown Village were a single project, the District 
Court erroneously determined that Midtown Village was constructed pursuant to a 
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common plan. In fact, the plans for Midtown Village changed constantly. An entire 
tower was eliminated. The size of one of the towers was reduced by 20 percent. A 
separate mechanical plant facility was added, and a host of other changes were made. 
Perhaps most telling is the fact that the construction budget ballooned by fifty percent 
from about $60 million to $90 million. Again, even if the changes did not negate the 
existence of a common plan outright, whether there was a common plan was plainly a 
disputed question of material fact that could not be resolved on a motion for summary 
judgment. 
Third, the District Court misapplied the "reasonable promptness" element of the 
Calder Bros. test. Despite the fact that four months of inactivity followed completion of 
the Icon Building and nine months of inactivity followed the excavation work, the 
District Court concluded that, as a matter of law, work on Midtown Village was 
"prosecuted with reasonable promptness.55 What constitutes reasonable promptness is 
obviously inherently factual and the District Court ought not have resolved the issue short 
of trial. 
Fourth, the District Court erred by ruling that work on Midtown Village was never 
materially abandoned. The authorities agree that whether a construction site has been 
abandoned must be determined by simply looking at the site itself; the only relevant 
factors are those that are visible to or may be inferred by a reasonable observer. The 
Midtown Village site was totally devoid of construction activity for months both before 
and after the Deed of Trust was recorded. All that an observer of the site would have 
seen between January 2005 and October 2005 was the completed Icon Building and a 
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massive pit surrounded by a fence. There were no workers on site, no materials stored on 
the site and no equipment. To one observer in March or April 2005 "the site appeared to < 
. . . have been vacated." The District Court's determination that, despite these facts, 
Midtown Village was not abandoned was based on its consideration of off-site 
i 
circumstances that could not have been observed or inferred by anyone viewing the site. 
Those circumstances were wholly irrelevant to the question of abandonment and the 
District Court erred in both considering them and weighing them against the evidence of 
on-site inactivity. 
Finally, the District Court erred by admitting and considering evidence that UWB 
obtained title insurance in connection with the Loan. The Lien Claimants claim to have 
offered such evidence in order to show that UWB had actual knowledge of the excavation 
work performed in late 2004. Actual knowledge of work has no relevance to the question 
of mechanic's lien priority, however. The Lien Claimants must, therefore, have offered 
evidence of title insurance to convince the District Court to impose the burden of 
Midtown JV's default on a faceless title insurer rather than on them. Rule 411 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence exists to prevent this kind of inequity. 
ARGUMENT 
June 17, 2005. That is the date on which the Deed of Trust was recorded. It is the 
most significant date for purposes of this appeal. The District Court's decision can be 
affirmed only in the absence of any disputed issue of material fact as to whether the 
commencement of work (within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5) on Midtown 
Village occurred before June 17, 2005, and even if it did, whether such work was 
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performed in connection with a single project performed under a common plan 
prosecuted with reasonable promptness and without material abandonment. The District 
Court misapplied the law and inexplicably found an absence of disputed material facts. 
This Court should, therefore, reverse the District Court's grant of partial summary 
judgment. 
Two separate projects were undertaken on the Midtown Village property prior to 
June 17, 2005. First, the Icon Building was constructed. Second, the Midtown Village 
site was excavated. Both projects were undertaken by different parties pursuant to 
separate contracts and both were financed independently of each other. Both projects had 
clearly defined beginnings and endings and both projects were followed by months-long 
intervals of total inactivity on the site. Neither project was promptly succeeded by 
construction work because there was no money to pay for additional work. It was not 
until months after June 17, 2005, when financing was finally secured, building permits 
were obtained, construction contracts signed and plans completed that another project 
could be (and was) undertaken on the site. That project was owned and constructed by 
different owners and contractors than were the prior projects. Work thus commenced for 
purposes of the Lien Claimants' alleged mechanic's liens after June 17, 2005. 
The District Court erred by reaching the opposite conclusion. The District Court 
did so by impermissibly weighing the evidence and by misinterpreting the relevant 
statute. For example, the District Court improperly engaged in fact-finding to conclude 
that "the project was not materially abandoned" despite also noting that "Mr. [Krumm, a 
representative of UWB] said the project looked abandoned from his perspective." See 
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Transcript, at pp. 68-69 [R. 8538]. Based on this and other similarly faulty conclusions, 
the District Court also erred in ruling that Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 entitles the Lien \ 
Claimants to "tack" back to work performed on the Midtown Village site prior to June 
17, 2005 for purposes of the priority of their alleged mechanic's liens. The District 
i 
Court's errors require the reversal of its decision. 
L LIEN PRIORITY UNDER UTAH'S MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE 
This appeal turns, in part, on whether the District Court erred in concluding that 
the Lien Claimants' work on Midtown Village commenced before UWB's Deed of Trust 
was recorded. Utah mechanic's liens 
[Rjelate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the commencement to do 
work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or improvement, 
and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which 
may have attached subsequently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5. The "commencement" requirement exists to give potential 
buyers and lienors, such as banks and mortgagees (like UWB), notice of the fact that 
unrecorded mechanic's liens may have attached to the subject property. See Calder Bros. 
Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 n.l (Utah 1982) ("[V]isible evidence of work 
performed provides notice to any interested party that work has commenced."); Western 
Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Corp., 424 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1967) 
("The problem is one of notice . . . to all the world that liens may have attached."); 
Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'I Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
("[Commencement of visible work is treated as imparting constructive notice of a 
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lien."); Diversified Mortgage Inv. vs. Cepacia, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 682, 685 (S.D. Iowa 
1975) ("'[Commencement' . . . is a term of art keyed to constructive notice. It is a 
different concept than commencement cin fact.'"). Notice is important because the 
possibility that a mechanic's Hen may have attached could obviously influence a lender's 
decision to lend money if the land on which work has been performed is to be security for 
the potential loan. 
Importantly, the notice of commencement provided by visible evidence of work at 
the site is solely constructive. Whether a party had actual notice of the commencement of 
work is wholly irrelevant to the question of mechanic's lien priority. See Ketchum, 
Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1224 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). This is so for three compelling reasons: first, an actual notice 
standard "would multiply litigation over the issue of whether the third party had actual 
notice"; second, an actual notice standard would have an "adverse impact on construction 
financing" because lenders would be reluctant to lend if any work had already occurred; 
and third, because the legislature could have specified an actual notice standard, but did 
not, apparently preferring the predictability ensured by constructive notice of 
commencement. Id. 
For purposes of mechanic's lien priority, the commencement of visible work by 
one party is not alone enough to permit all those who later provide materials or labor to 
tack their work back to the time that such visible work was commenced. Instead, a lien 
claimant's work must pass a four-element test before its mechanic's lien will relate back 
to the earlier work performed by another party: 
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For one contractor's lien to relate back to the commencement of work . . . 
by another contractor . . . both contractors' projects must have been 
performed in connection with what is essentially a single project performed 
under a common plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness and without 
material abandonment. 
Colder Bros., 652 P.2d at 924 (citations omitted); see also Nu-TrendElec, Inc. v. 
DeseretFed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, Inc., 786 P.2d 1369, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("For 
priority of a mechanic's lien to relate back to the beginning of the work for which the lien 
is claimed, the work must all be part of the same project; in other words, the work must 
have a continuity of purpose such that a reasonable observer of the site would be on 
notice that work was underway for which a lien could be claimed.") (citations omitted). 
Determining whether a lien claimant's work was part of a (1) "single project," (2) 
"performed under a common plan," (3) "prosecuted with reasonable promptness" and (4) 
"without material abandonment" requires a "complex inquiry" involving "fact-sensitive 
question[s]" that "cannot be decided as a matter of law." See EDSA/Cloward, L.L.C. v. 
Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, ^ 25 n.4, 122 P.3d 646 (citing Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 1226); 
Nu-Trend Elec, 786 P.2d at 1371. This is so because the focus of the inquiry is an 
objective test for whether, at the time the interest over which the mechanic's lien is 
purported to have priority was acquired, "a reasonable person would know by looking at 
the land that lienable work is underway." Klihanoff, 2005 UT App 367, \ 21 (citing Nu-
Trend Elec, 786 P.2d at 1371); see also Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 1226 ("A key concern is 
whether third parties would be on notice that work was continuing or, rather, would 
believe that work on the initial project had ceased."). And, "where reasonable persons 
could differ whether the [appearance of the subject property] provided notice that lienable 
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work was underway, the issue cannot be decided as a matter of law." Klibanoff, 2005 UT 
App 367, Tj 28 (citing Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996)); see also 
Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C, 2008 UT 28, f 21, 183 P.3d 248 (non-
moving party's raising reasonable inference contrary to movant's position precludes 
summary judgment). 
IL EXCAVATION ALONE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
COMMENCEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION 
The District Court erred in ruling that cc[t]he substantial excavation work done in 
September 2004 through early 2005 was not mere site preparation work; rather it was 
clearly the commencement of a large construction project." See Corrected Order, at p. 8 
[R. 7850]. Excavation alone should not be and is not the kind of work that can constitute 
the commencement "to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement" Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (emphasis added). Rather, only when the 
footings or foundation are constructed (or materials are furnished on the ground) does 
construction of a structure or improvement commence for mechanic's lien purposes. The 
footings for Midtown Village were constructed months after June 17, 2005. Accordingly, 
commencement occurred for purposes of the Lien Claimants' alleged mechanic's liens 
well after June 17, 2005 
Utah's current commencement standard is highly fact-sensitive and far from a 
bright-line. See, e.g., Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, fflf 20-30 (whether irrigation system 
improvements, fencing, surveying, staking and soil testing amounted to commencement 
was a fact question not subject to resolution on a motion for summary judgment); E. W. 
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Allen & Assocs., Inc. v. FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504, 1509 (D. Utah 1991) (applying Utah 
law and observing that "[cjlearing land, grading land, and general excavation on the land 
are also not sufficient to be commencement"). It is, for example, presently impossible to 
identify the exact point at which the movement of earth on a site - a teaspoonful, a cubic 
yard, one ton, a depth often feet, or some other measure - will be deemed to provide 
sufficient notice that lienable work is underway to constitute the commencement of 
construction. A clearer standard would serve the predictability goal of the mechanic's 
lien statute far better. See Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage 
Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (constructive, rather than 
actual notice of commencement provides "the predictability sought by the mechanic's 
lien statutory scheme"). 
Section 38-1-5 makes no mention of the staking, grading or excavation that courts 
have typically focused on when performing a commencement analysis. The statute 
actually says that commencement occurs when work is done or materials are furnished 
"on the ground for the structure or improvement." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5. It is not 
enough, then, merely that some work be done; to constitute commencement the work 
must be "for the structure or improvement." See Diversified Mortgage Inv. vs. Gepada, 
Inc., 401 F. Supp. 682, 685-86 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (surveying case law, stating that for the 
"great majority of cases" mere preparation of site, including removal or digging away of 
soil from the site, is insufficient to "to give a mechanic's lien preference over a 
subsequently recorded mortgage"); United Lumber Co. v. Minmar Inv. Co., 472 S.W.2d 
630, 633-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (holding general excavation insufficient to constitute 
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commencement); Mack Indus., Inc. v. Donald W. Nelson, Inc., 134 So. 2d 821, 824 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (excavating to prepare the land for building purposes did not 
constitute commencement). While staking, grading, excavating and shoring may all be 
absolutely essential components of an overall construction project, they are 
preconstruction tasks. They prepare the way for the structure or improvement. They are 
neither part of nor "for the structure or improvement." As a result, such preconstruction 
tasks cannot constitute commencement no matter their scale, complexity or visibility. 
Section 38-1-5 dictates that commencement occurs when work is done or 
materials are furnished "for the structure or improvement." See also Klibanoffi 2008 UT 
App. 284, |^ 5 n.7 (no commencement because pipe and weir were "not intended to be 
incorporated into the final construction"); see also See Diversified Mortgage Inv., 401 F. 
Supp. at 685-86 ("5[T]he labor or materials must be such as could afterward become, or 
be considered, a component part of the structure5") (quoting Clark v. General Elec. Co., 
420 S.W.2d 830 (Ark. 1967)). The statutory language clearly contemplates a qualitative, 
rather than quantitative (i.e., how much earth is moved, or how much fence was erected) 
test for commencement. In the typical case of a building, of course, the first work is done 
on, or materials are furnished for, the footings or foundation walls. See, e.g., Diversified 
Mortgage Inv., 401 F. Supp. at 687 (commencement began "the date actual on-site work 
began on the motel footings"). Affirmatively equating commencement with the 
construction of a footing or foundation, i.e., pouring concrete for such components, 
would eliminate all of the uncertainty presently inherent in Utah's commencement 
jurisprudence. Concrete footings and foundations are visible, obvious to any reasonable 
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observer of a construction site and unambiguously indicate that a construction project has 
started, as opposed to being merely planned or contemplated. 
The utility of a distinction between site preparation and actual construction is 
made crystal clear by the facts of this case. Tower Development employed Reynolds 
Brothers to excavate the Midtown Village site and sell the excavated dirt, and Wadsworth 
Construction to shore-up the sides of the excavated pit. This excavation and shoring 
work concluded well before the plans for the South Tower were complete, before there 
was financing to build anything, before a building permit was obtained, before a general 
contractor with sufficient bonding capacity was hired, and before Midtown JV acquired 
the land. After the excavation was complete, the site was devoid of activity for at least 
nine months before any further work was performed. Throughout that period there was 
nothing visible on the site that would have indicated to any observer that the construction 
of a structure or improvement was underway. At the very least, the appearance of the 
deserted site was ambiguous (and thus poor notice that a construction project was 
underway). That ambiguity disappeared in October 2005 (four months after the Deed of 
Trust was recorded) when workers mobilized to the site to form and pour concrete 
footings for the South Tower parking structure. 
The District Court erred by failing to acknowledge or apply the distinction 
between mere site preparation, which cannot constitute commencement under section 38-
1-5, and actual construction of a "structure or improvement," which does. Instead, the 
District Court ruled that simply because the pre-June 17, 2005 excavation work was 
"substantial," commencement occurred when that work began. See Corrected Order, at p. 
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8 [R. 7850] ("The substantial excavation work done in September 2004 through early 
2005 was not mere site preparation work; rather it was clearly the commencement of a 
large construction project."). This conclusion was erroneous because excavation, no 
matter the volume of earth moved, does not amount to commencement. The District 
Court also incorrectly ruled that there was no factual dispute about whether the pre-June 
17, 2005 excavation and related shoring work "became part of the work of 
improvement." See Transcript, at p. 62 [R. 8538] ("True an excavation is not a structure 
per se, but what we're dealing here with is a work of improvement, an overall work of 
improvement so it was incorporated into that."); Corrected Order at p. 3 [R. 7855]. In 
fact, that issue was disputed. See DiBernardi Depo., 54:7-13 [R. 5059(A)] (shoring work 
never provided any support for subsequently constructed building); Wadsworth Depo., 
36:13-17 [R. 5059(A)] (same). The District Court's decision should consequently be 
reversed. 
The District Court also erred by considering and relying on UWB's actual 
knowledge of excavation on the Midtown Village site. See Corrected Order, at p. 9 [R. 
7849] ("The substantial excavation work done in September 2004 through early 2005 
also constituted actual notice to both BankFirst and the title company that work had 
commenced . . . ."). Actual knowledge of commencement is totally irrelevant to the 
question of lien priority under Utah's statutory scheme. See EDSA/Cloward, L.L.C. v. 
Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, f 15, 122 P.3d 646 ("The Ketchum court confirmed that, 
regardless of actual notice, visible work or materials must be present to establish 
priority."). Thus whether UWB actually knew that excavation work was performed prior 
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to June 17, 2005 should not have factored into the District Court's decision. 
The Lien Claimants argued previously, and likely will again, that Reynolds \ 
Brothers' excavation work must amount to commencement because the excavation made 
it obvious that construction of a building was anticipated. See Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at p. 3 [R. 5505]. This 
argument was squarely rejected in Dollar Bank, FSB v. EM2 Development Corp., 716 
A.2d 671 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). In that case a developer had turned raw land into 
improved building lots by installing sewer lines, placing fill material and building a 
retaining wall. See id., at 611. One of the improved lots was purchased by the 
contractor, who gave Dollar Bank a mortgage. See id., at 671. The contractor began to 
build a house on the lot and one of the subcontractors filed a mechanic's lien. See id. 
The subcontractor claimed that its lien had priority over the mortgage because the 
developer commenced visible construction by improving the lot before Dollar Bank's 
mortgage was recorded. See id., at 672. Affirming the trial court's determination that the 
mortgage was superior to the subcontractor's mechanic's lien, the court recognized that 
while the developer "likely anticipated that an improvement would eventually rest on [the 
lot]," the creation of the lot was not in and of itself "calculated to ensure the completion 
of a house" and thus did not constitute commencement. Id., at 674. 
Just as the improvement of raw ground into residential building lots does not 
ensure that homes will be built thereon, Reynolds Brothers' excavation was not 
calculated to, and did not ensure that Midtown Village would be built therein. Indeed, 
Tower Development was incapable of building anything at the time Reynolds Brothers 
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finished its excavation work. The Lien Claimants' claim that excavation must have 
provided notice of commencement is thus wrong and the District Court erred in granting 
their Motion for Summary Judgment. See Corrected Order, at p. 8 [R. 7850] ('The 
substantial excavation work . . . was clearly the commencement of a large construction 
project."). Commencement did not occur until footings were constructed in October 
2005. The Court should take advantage of this opportunity to clarify and square its 
jurisprudence with the mechanic's lien statute by ruling that commencement occurs for 
purposes of section 38-1-5 upon the delivery of materials or performance of visible work 
for the structure or improvement itself. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LIEN 
CLAIMANTS' POST-JUNE 17, 2005 WORK RELATES BACK TO 
PRE-JUNE 17, 2005 WORK 
Even if the mass excavation work performed in late 2004 and early 2005 were the 
kind of work that could constitute commencement for purposes of mechanic's lien 
attachment, the District Court nonetheless erred in ruling that the Lien Claimants' alleged 
liens have priority over the Deed of Trust. Given that no work occurred on the Midtown 
Village site for at least nine months after the mass excavation concluded, the District 
Court was obliged to and did undertake an analysis of whether the Lien Claimants' 
alleged mechanic's liens relate back to work performed prior to June 17, 2005. The 
District Court made at least two errors in performing this analysis. First, the District 
Court impermissibly weighed the evidence before it. Second, the District Court 
misapplied the legal standard for a mechanic's lien to relate back. Both errors mandate 
reversal. 
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A. The District Court Erred by Weighing Evidence. 
Trial courts are not permitted to weigh the evidence before them on motions for 
summary judgment. See Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^ f 24, 42 
P.3d 379 (citation omitted). Rather, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, trial courts are 
obliged to determine only whether the material facts are disputed. See id. Under this 
stringent standard, summary judgment is only appropriate when either "the facts are so 
clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about the underlying facts or about the 
application of the governing legal standard to the facts" or the facts "are so tenuous, 
vague, or insufficiently established" that "the claim fails as a matter of law." Berenda v. 
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996). The District Court was not presented with either 
circumstance. As a result, in granting the Lien Claimants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the District Court must have weighed the evidence before it. 
Examples of the District Court's weighing evidence are numerous. With respect 
to the question of whether Midtown Village was materially abandoned when excavation 
work concluded in January 2005, the evidence before the District Court was essentially as 
follows: 
Evidence tending to show abandonment: 
1. Between the time the mass excavation work was completed and June 17, 
2005 when the Deed of Trust was recorded, ownership of Midtown Village was 
transferred from Tower Development, of which Myler was the sole owner, to the newly 
created Midtown JV, of which Myler owned only 25 percent, see Snyder Deck, ffi[ 15-18 
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[R. 4968-69]; 
2. ccMr. [Krumm, a representative of UWB] said the project looked abandoned 
from his perspective/' see Transcript, at p. 68 [R. 8538]; 
3. No work occurred on the site between January 2005 and October 2005. see 
Myler Depo., 178:23-183:23 [R. 5059(A)]; and 
4. When Dan Christensen was determined to be an inadequate guarantor in 
late 2004, Myler believed that Midtown Village may be "dead." See Myler Depo., 146:9-
15 [R. 5059(A)] 
Evidence tending to show no abandonment: 
1. Tower Development sought financing for Midtown Village and UWB 
worked toward financing Midtown Village throughout the latter part of 2004 and the first 
half of 2005, see Myler Depo., 23:9-25:3 [R. 5059(A)]; 
2. The plans for Midtown Village were revised during 2005, see Beardall 
Deck, 1fl[ 8-9 [R. 4898]; 
3. Ellsworth Paulsen was one of the general contractors expected to build 
Midtown Village at all times between August 2003 and August 2005, see Myler Depo., 
162:7-163:6 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Aff, ^120, 24, 26 [R. 1610-11]; and 
4. Myler continued to pre-sell condominium units in Midtown Village through 
the time the Deed of Trust was recorded. See Myler Depo., 118:4-120:18 [R. 5059(A)]. 
If these circumstances do not clearly show that Midtown Village was abandoned, 
at the very least they demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute. A reasonable person 
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considering these facts could readily conclude that Midtown Village was abandoned.2 
That being the case, the District Court must have weighed these facts in order to conclude 
that no abandonment occurred. See Corrected Order, at p. 9 [R. 7849]. That weighing 
was inappropriate and merits reversal. 
The existence of a common plan for the development of Midtown Village provides 
another example of the District Court's having weighed the evidence. Again, the 
evidence went both ways: 
Evidence tending to show a common plan 
1. Midtown Village was always intended to be a mixed-use development 
consisting of three or four towers of four-to-seven stories each, see Myler Depo., 20:2-
21:18, 159:3-160:6 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Depo., 37:16-38:10, 116:11-117:18 
5059(A)]; 
2. Only one architect was ever involved in the Midtown Village development, 
see Harris Depo., 153:2-23 [R. 5059(A)]; 
3. Ellsworth Paulsen was a party to each general contract to build Midtown 
Village, see Washburn Aff., ffif 2, 6, 20, 24, 26 [R. 1610-11, 1613-14]; and 
4. Myler was, directly or indirectly, an owner of some or all of each of the 
entities that owned Midtown Village since 2002. See Myler Depo., 153:16-156:4 [R. 
5059(A)]; Snyder Decl., ffl[ 15-18 [R. 4968-69]. 
2
 As explained infra, off-site circumstances such as financing, plans and subjective 
beliefs are legally irrelevant to the question of material abandonment. Those 
circumstances are mentioned here only for purposes of demonstrating the existence of a 
factual dispute and because the District Court considered them. 
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Evidence tending to show the absence of a common plan 
1. The plans and designs for Midtown Village changed repeatedly over time, 
see Myler Depo., 20:13-21:12 [R. 5059(A)]; 
2. Ownership of the Midtown Village property changed hands numerous 
times prior to June 17, 2005, see Snyder Deck, ff 15-18 [R. 4968-69]; 
3. Tower Development's original contract with Ellsworth Paulsen included 
excavation, but Myler independently hired Reynolds Brothers to perform the excavation 
work, see Standard Form of Design-Build Agreement and General Conditions Between 
Owner and Design-Builder, Deposition Exhibit 18 [R. 5059(A)]; letter agreement 
between Myler and Reynolds Brothers, Deposition Exhibit 62 [R. 5059(A)]; and 
4. Three general contractors were retained to build Midtown Village on three 
different occasions pursuant to three different contracts. See Washburn Aff, ^ | 2, 6, 20, 
24,26[R. 1610-11, 1613-14]. 
Like the facts relating to abandonment, these facts are neither so clearly 
demonstrative of a common plan that reasonable people could not disagree about the 
existence of a common plan, nor so vague that there is no chance a reasonable fact finder 
could not find that a common plan was lacking. As a result, the District Court must have 
weighed the evidence in order to rule that there was a common plan. See Corrected 
Order, at p. 9 [R. 7849]. Having engaged in impermissible evidence weighing, the 
District Court's decision to grant the Lien Claimants5 Motion for Summary Judgment 
should be reversed. 
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B. The District Court Misapplied the Four-Element Test for 
Relation Back. 
The Corrected Order indicates that the District Court purported to apply more or 
less the correct test for whether the Lien Claimants' alleged mechanic's liens relate back 
to work performed prior to June 17, 2005. See Corrected Order, at p. 9 (cc[T]o determine 
whether material abandonment has occurred, the Court must determine if a single project 
was constructed under a common plan and [sic] prosecuted with reasonable 
promptness.") [R. 7849]. The District Court erred, however, in its application of that test 
to the facts. 
The Calder Bros, court formulated the test for whether one contractor's work 
relates back to earlier work for purposes of mechanic's lien priority under Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-5 as follows: 
For one contractor's lien to relate back to the commencement of work . . . 
by another contractor . . . both contractors' projects must have been 
performed in connection with what is essentially a single project performed 
under a common plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness and without 
material abandonment. 
Calder Bros, Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). The District Court ruled 
that undisputed facts satisfied each of the four elements of this test. In fact, none of the 
elements were satisfied. At the very least, the material facts with respect to each element 
were in dispute. 
i. Midtown Village is Comprised of at Least Three Distinct 
Projects, 
Far from being "essentially a single project" such that the Lien Claimants can tack 
back to work performed before June 17, 2005, the development of Midtown Village was 
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actually broken into in at least three discrete projects. The fundamental reason the 
development was broken into three projects and executed in piecemeal fashion was that 
Myler and his companies lacked financing before June 17, 2005 and were thus incapable 
of performing the projects in any other way. 
In order to constitute a "project," this Court has said that cc[t]he work must have a 
continuity of purpose such that a reasonable observer of the site would be on notice that 
work was underway for which a lien could be claimed." Nu-Trend Elec, Inc. v. Deseret 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, Inc., 786 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). It would 
obviously be impossible for a "reasonable observer of the site" to determine whether 
work had a "continuity of purpose" by observing the site on a single occasion. This 
element must, therefore, require a retrospective evaluation of the nature and course of 
work performed on the subject site over time. At the same time, however, the 
requirement that there be continuity of purpose seems to require, at least in part, an 
evaluation of the developer's intent (or purpose) at the time the work begins. The 
developer's intent would be difficult, if not impossible, to discern from an observation of 
the site. As a result, assessing whether work is part of a single project or multiple 
projects appears to necessitate consideration of both the developer's subjective intent at 
the beginning of the project and visible activity on the site over time. 
Several Utah Supreme Court opinions addressing the "single project" element 
support this conclusion. For example, in Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734, 736 (Utah 
1985), the court suggested that whether the work at issue related to a single contract or 
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multiple contracts is a factor to be considered. Other courts also place significant weight 
on whether work occurred pursuant to one or multiple contracts. See, e.g., S.K. Drywall, 
Inc. v. Developers Fin. Group, Inc., 819 P.2d 931, 935-36 (Ariz. 1991) ("By far the most 
important factor . . . is whether the work was performed pursuant to a single contract 
between the owner and the general contractor."); Dickason Goodman Lumber Co. v. 
Foresman, 251 P. 70, 72 (Okla. 1926) (holding construction of bungalow on basement 
dug four years earlier "was another distinct plan, separate and apart from the first and 
under a different contract"). Presumably if a developer enters into a single contract for a 
wide variety of work, all of the work within the scope of the contract should be 
considered a single project. On the other hand, if the developer has multiple contracts 
with different contractors for different types of work, the work contemplated by each 
contract may well be a separate project. See Fields v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 69 P. 528, 
530-31 (Utah 1902) ("If the materials were furnished for separate and distinct purposes, 
under distinct separate contracts . . . a right for a lien, if any, would date from the time of 
the commencement to furnish materials for the different separate contracts on each 
separate order."). In any event, "whether work is for the same project as previously is a 
question of fact. . . ." Nu-Trend Elec, 786 P.2d at 1371-72. 
3
 The Duckett court affirmed the trial court's finding that the house at issue in the case 
was constructed as a single project even though it was not built by a single general 
contractor, but by different tradesmen and materialmen pursuant to separate contracts. 
See Duckett, 699 P.2d at 735-36. Unlike this case, the owner of the house at issue in 
Duckett did not change over time, there is no indication that the plans for the house ever 
changed, and the house was constructed in just 11 months (or approximately the same 
period of inactivity between excavation and construction of the South Tower footings). 
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A reasonable observer of the Midtown Village site would not have seen work with 
anything approaching a "continuity of purpose" until months after June 17, 2005. To the 
contrary, the work would have appeared to be three projects - the Icon Building followed 
by mass excavation followed by construction of the South Tower- each separated by 
months of complete inactivity. That Tower Development and Myler intended the Icon 
Building and excavation projects to be separate from the construction of the South Tower 
is reflected by the fact that, lacking financing, Tower Development was incapable of 
building the South Tower until after June 17, 2005. Thus, while Myler may have wished 
and hoped to build Midtown Village as a single project from the start, absent the 
necessary financial resources, he could not have ever reasonably intended to do so. 
Construction of the Icon Building was the first distinct project related to Midtown 
Village. A host of facts show that the Icon Building was a separate project, apart and 
different from any other element of Midtown Village: Tower Development executed a 
separate contract with Ellsworth Paulsen for construction of the Icon Building; the City 
of Orem issued a separate building permit for construction of the Icon Building; 
Ellsworth Paulsen built the Icon Building, but was not involved in the subsequent mass 
excavation; the Icon Building was constructed on a separate parcel of property owned by 
Western Oasis; the Icon Building had a unique purpose, i.e., condominium sales, 
different from any other part of Midtown Village; approximately four months passed 
after completion of the Icon Building before any other work occurred on the Midtown 
Village site; unlike any other work on Midtown Village, construction of the Icon 
Building was financed out of Myler's personal resources and a construction loan from 
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Millenia Investment Corporation; and Washburn, the Midtown Village project manager 
for Ellsworth Paulsen (and later, for Big-D), considers the Icon Building to be "separate" 
from the rest of what became Midtown Village. 
The evidence before the District Court showed that the second project, mass 
excavation, was equally dissociated from the rest of Midtown Village: the City of Orem 
separately authorized only the mass excavation; excavation began approximately four 
months after the Icon Building was completed; Myler, not Tower Development or 
Midtown JV, contracted exclusively with Reynolds Brothers to perform the excavation 
work; Reynolds Brothers extended credit to Myler, and Marshall Bank, N.A. loaned 
money to Western Oasis to finance the cost of the excavation work; approximately nine 
months passed after completion of the excavation before any other work occurred on 
Midtown Village; when the excavation was finished there were no sufficiently complete 
plans to construct any other part of Midtown Village; and Reynolds Brothers was not 
retained to excavate spot footings, which were a necessary component of the towers' 
foundations. Further, instead of occurring in the normal course of a coordinated, pre-
planned construction schedule, the excavation work was opportunistically undertaken in 
an effort to beat the weather, when there happened to be a buyer for the excavated dirt, 
and to suit Myler's marketing purposes. 
A third project commenced when construction of the South Tower parking 
structure began in October or November 2005, at least four months after the Deed of 
Trust was recorded. In all likelihood, of course, without the Loan, the excavated hole 
would still be there today. The facts demonstrating that construction of the South Tower 
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was a separate project, distinct from the Icon Building and mass excavation, are as 
follows: Ellsworth Paulsen formed two joint ventures - with Bud Bailey and thereafter 
with Big-D - both of which signed separate general contracts with Tower Development 
and then with Midtown JV, respectively, before work on the parking structure began4; 
Ellsworth Paulsen withdrew from its joint venture with Big-D during the prosecution of 
work on the South Tower; the City of Orem issued a building permit to Tower 
Development, not Midtown JV (the owner) on October 7, 2005 for the construction of the 
underground parking structure only; the Big-D/Ellsworth Paulsen joint venture filed a 
Notice of Commencement for the "Parking Structure-Midtown Village" in the online 
State Construction Registry on October 11, 2005; Reynolds Brothers commenced 
excavation of the spot footings for the South Tower in October or November 2005, 
approximately nine months after the mass excavation was completed; a full set of plans 
for the South Tower was first submitted to the City on November 3, 2005, and a full 
building permit for the above-ground portion of the South Tower was issued on February 
13, 2006, eight months after the Deed of Trust was recorded; and Midtown JV paid for 
construction of the South Tower with the proceeds of the Loan. 
To recap, each of these projects had a separate, distinct purpose. Each proceeded 
under a separate contract and was financed with different sources of money. Different 
parties were involved in each project and substantial amounts of time passed between the 
completion of one project and the beginning of the next. The reason that these projects 
4
 Midtown JV did not even exist at the time the Icon Building was constructed or when 
the mass excavation work was performed. Midtown JV was not organized until April 
2005. See Myler Depo., 155:10-13 [R. 5059(A)]. 
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were not and could not all be a unified, single project was, of course, that until June 17, 
2005, Myler and his companies lacked funding to build Midtown Village; in other words, 
Myler was incapable of building Midtown Village as a single project and could not have 
reasonably intended to do so. Thus, the Icon Building construction and mass excavation 
occurred in fits and starts, and then only when Myler was able to raise enough money (or 
secure contractor credit) to undertake an activity in an effort to maintain public interest in 
Midtown Village. 
The Lien Claimants tellingly conceded that the Icon Building was constructed as a 
separate project, distinct from the balance of Midtown Village. In the opening 
memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Lien Claimants 
argued that their alleged mechanic's liens should relate back to the commencement of 
construction of the Icon Building. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, at p. 23 [R. 1643] ("On September 10, 2003, Ellsworth [Paulsen] 
commenced visible and substantial construction work on the Project when it began 
construction of the Icon building.")- When UWB argued in response that the Icon 
Building was a separate project, the Lien Claimants' abandoned their Icon Building 
argument in favor of tacking back to the excavation work instead. See Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at p. 5 [R. 
5503] ("The Lien Claimants request that the Court hold as a matter of law that the 
$800,000 excavation work that occurred in the latter part of 2004 through the early part 
of 2005, constitutes the first visible commencement of work . . . .") . The Lien Claimants 
ignored the Icon Building in their reply memorandum. See Reply Memorandum in 
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Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [R. 5469-5507]. 
If construction of the Icon Building were a separate project, as the Lien Claimants 
concede, the excavation must also be a separate project. Both projects had separate, 
distinct purposes; each proceeded under a separate contract and was financed with money 
from different sources; different parties were involved in each contract and project; and 
months passed between the completion of one project and the beginning of the next. 
Thus, if the Lien Claimants cannot tack their alleged liens back to the Icon Building, they 
also cannot tack back to the excavation work. Inasmuch as the District Court ruled to the 
contrary, its decision should be reversed. 
ii- There Never Was a Common Plan for Midtown Village. 
Even assuming that construction of the Icon Building, excavation and subsequent 
construction of the South and North Towers were a single project, and they were not, 
Midtown Village was not constructed pursuant to a common plan. With respect to the 
plans for Midtown Village, the only constant was change. The plans morphed and 
evolved seemingly by the hour, both before and after the excavation work was 
performed. When Ellsworth Paulsen was first hired to build Midtown Village in May 
2004, Tower Development had only a conceptual design; as the "design-builder" 
Ellsworth Paulsen was to provide construction plans. See Standard Form of Design-
Build Agreement and General Conditions Between Owner and Design-Builder, 
Deposition Exhibit 18 [R. 5059(A)]. The plans were still "incomplete . . . or non-
existen[t]" over a year later when Midtown JV contracted with Big-D. See letter from 
Robert S. Moore to Larry Myler, Deposition Exhibit 21 [R. 5059(A)]. 
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What designs and plans there were for Midtown Village were ever-changing. One 
day, Midtown Village was to consist of four towers in a capital "E" configuration; the 
next day, there were only three towers configured as a "U." See Myler Depo., 20:2-
21:18, 159:3-160:6 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Depo., 37:16-38:10, 116:11-117:18 [R. 
5059(A)]; First Level floor plan, Deposition Exhibit 2 [R. 5059(A)]. The towers almost 
doubled in height from the originally-planned four stories to the final seven. See Myler 
Depo., 20:2-21:18 [R. 5059(A)]. The West Tower shed one-fifth of its size. See 
Washburn Depo., 136:10-137:25 [R. 5059(A)]. The towers were at first meant to have 
open-air atriums, but the plans changed to call for a closed-roof design. See Washburn 
Depo., 169:6-170:13 [R. 5059(A)]; Harris Depo., 92:21-95:7 [R. 5059(A)]. The 
mechanical systems for Midtown Village {i.e., the boilers, chillers and fire suppression 
system, etc.) were originally planned to reside on the roof, but were moved to an entirely 
newly conceived underground structure known as the Central Plant. See Harris Depo., 
88:18-91:3 [R. 5059(A)]. Even when a Central Plant was decided upon, the plans were 
changed to trim approximately 2,000 square feet. See Harris Depo., 87:2-20, 143:19-
144:6 [R. 5059(A)]. The magnitude and significance of these changes is reflected in the 
fact that the budget for the development increased by $30,000,000 (or approximately 50 
percent) from an initial $59,000,000 to almost $90,000,000. See Washburn Depo., 185:9-
186:2 [R. 5059(A)]. 
Other changes, cosmetic and functional, were legion: part of a breezeway was 
eliminated, see Harris Depo., 135:10-137:22 [R. 5059(A)]; a separate storm-water 
detention pond was moved to the second level of the South Tower underground parking 
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structure, see Washburn Depo., 34:8-36:20, 171:13-172:16 [R. 5059(A)], Hams Depo., 
43:7-44:19 |R. 5059(A)]; a parking area and park were eliminated from the site plan, see 
Harris Depo., 41:12-25, 42:24-43:17 [R. 5059(A)]; the West Tower parking structure was 
redesigned to double its size, see Harris Depo., 26:12-29:16 [R. 5059(A)]; internal 
hallways were eliminated and stairways and elevator access points were added, see 
Washburn Depo., 174:24-175:13 [R. 5059(A)], Harris Depo., 36:8-37:7, 39:5-40:11, 
95:25-98:5, 208:15-209:2 [R. 5059(A)]; the roof plans were changed from asphalt 
shingles to metal and composite shingles, see Washburn Depo., 141:5-142:7 [R. 
5059(A)]; and the originally planned vinyl windows were replaced with wood windows. 
See Washburn Depo, 141:5-142:23 [R. 5059(A)]. Myler testified that cc[t]he outer look 
and design and architecture of the building evolved. It was more of a constant thing, 
rather than a one-time change. The number of units, of course, changed over time." See 
Myler Depo, 20:13-21:12 [R. 5059(A)], 
The District Court correctly acknowledged that the plans for Midtown Village 
were amended repeatedly. See Transcript, at p. 67 (cTt is correct that the plans changed 
over time.") [R. 8538]. The District Court went so far as to note that ccthere were a lot of 
change orders and changes in the plan and the specifications to construct the project. . . 
." Id. But, observing that Midtown Village was always meant to be a mixed-use 
development - albeit significantly different in size and shape than originally conceived -
the District Court erred in ruling that Midtown Village was "constructed under a common 
plan." See Corrected Order, at p. 9 [R. 7849]. At the very least, whether a common plan 
existed was a disputed issue of material fact that the District Court was not permitted to 
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resolve on the Lien Claimants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
iii. The Construction of Midtown Village was Not Prosecuted 
with Reasonable Promptness. 
The District Court mistakenly believed that there was only a five-month cessation 
of work after the excavation work was completed. See Transcript, at p. 69 [R. 8538]. In 
fact, in addition to the approximately four months of inactivity after the Icon Building 
was finished, the development was mothballed again for nine months after excavation. 
Delays of this length are not consistent with "reasonable promptness." To the contrary, 
the excavated hole was so large that no reasonable observer of the site would have 
expected it to remain empty for any length of time. As demonstrated by a June 2005 
Deseret News article - which posed and tried to answer the question "[s]o why is the 
giant hole on State Street in Orem . . . still just that - a giant hole?" - a reasonable 
observer would have expected construction of a structure to begin immediately in such a 
large hole. See Moore Deck, ^ 7 [R. 4843-44, 4857]. The fact that construction did not 
proceed for approximately nine months after excavation is ample evidence of the absence 
of reasonable promptness. 
The case law does not establish or identify a bright-line test for "reasonable 
promptness.55 Instead, u[q]uestions of reasonableness are typically questions of fact." 
EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, ^ 21, 122 P.3d 646 (citing Taylor 
v. Johnson, 393 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah 1964)). One case suggests that reasonable 
promptness will be found where improvements were performed "in one continuous 
operation." Leedyv. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 142 So.2d 99, 103 (Fla. Ct. App. 
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1962). In another, a four-month layoff was determined to be a sufficient basis for a 
finding that work was not prosecuted with reasonable promptness. See Mack Indus., Inc. 
v. Donald W. Nelson, Inc., 134 So.2d 821, 824 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961). An eleven or twelve 
month cessation of work was too long for the project to be considered continuous in 
another. See Langford Tool & Drill Co. v. Phenix Biocomposites, LLC, 668 N. W.2d 438, 
443 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). At least one state statutorily deems construction projects 
completed after 60 days of inactivity. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3086(c) (2009). 
In what is perhaps the leading promptness case, Dickason Goodman Lumber Co. 
v. Foresman, 251 P. 70 (Okla. 1926), the defendant built a basement in 1918. He and his 
wife lived in the basement for about four years before building a house on top in 1923. 
The mechanic's lien claimant plaintiff supplied materials for the construction of the 
house and claimed a lien having priority as of the time the basement was excavated. The 
Court held that, separated by four years, the basement and house were not part of "one 
continuous plan" and thus, the lien claimant's lien could not relate back to 1918. Id,, at 
72. In summary, reasonable promptness denotes a continuous operation or plan, and the 
absence of lengthy periods of inactivity. 
Midtown Village was hardly constructed as a "continuous operation." Far from 
seamlessly progressing from concept, to plans, to site preparation, to construction, the 
development lurched from one task to the next in a wholly unscheduled, unpredictable 
fashion dictated exclusively by Myler and his companies' finances. Long periods of on-
site inactivity were the inevitable consequence of this haphazard, what-we-can, when-we-
can approach to development. The site was devoid of activity for at least four months 
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following completion of the Icon Building, and for another nine months between mass 
excavation and actual construction. Both intervals would presumably have been much 
longer if Tower Development had not been lucky enough to find an excavator (Reynolds 
Brothers) willing to work on credit, and if Moves had opted against giving his financial 
backing to Midtown Village. The District Court thus erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that development of Midtown Village was prosecuted with reasonable promptness. 
iv. Midtown Village was Materially Abandoned. 
The District Court also erred in its analysis of the final element of the relation 
back test. A mechanic's lien may only relate back to earlier work for purposes of priority 
if the earlier work was not materially abandoned. See Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 
P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). The test for material abandonment took a couple of years to 
crystallize. In Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain 
Development Co., 784 P.2d 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court began its analysis of 
material abandonment by observing that Calder Bros, left the term undefined. The Court 
went on to note that other courts "focus on whether third parties would have notice that a 
construction project had commenced and had not been abandoned," suggesting an 
objective test for material abandonment. Id., at 1225. Then, however, the Ketchum Court 
cited Frank J. Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman, 311 A.2d 780 (Md. 1973), and observed 
that the Klein court "stated that in order to determine whether a material abandonment 
has occurred, an inquiry into intention must be made." Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 1226. 
While the Ketchum Court's reference to Klein suggested its endorsement of an at least 
partly subjective test for material abandonment, it did not definitively state the 
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appropriate test, opting instead to recognize that what constitutes material abandonment 
requires a "complex inquiry," and remanded the case for a hearing and the entry of 
findings- See id., at 1226-27. 
This Court's Nil-Trend Electric, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 
Inc., 786 P.2d 1369 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), decision the following year resolved the 
question of what test trial courts should apply for material abandonment in favor of a 
primarily objective analysis with a somewhat subjective component. The Court said that 
"a construction project has been materially abandoned when a reasonable observer of the 
site would be on notice that the persons who performed the work apparently do not intend 
to continue it to completion." Id., at 1371. The Court then confirmed that the subjective 
component of the test - the workers5 intent to continue - is also largely objective. The 
Court stated that the test is whether the worker "manifested any intention inconsistent 
with abandonment when it stopped work." Id. By using the word "manifested" the Court 
made it clear that a subjective intent not to abandon work must be apparent, i.e., the intent 
must be objectively identifiable, presumably from visible site conditions. See Langford 
Tool, 668 N.W.2d at 443-44 (comparing the "Kansas Rule," which holds that 
abandonment "is to be determined by the actual cessation of work, and not by the secret 
purposes of the owners," with the "Oregon Rule," holding that cessation of labor must be 
accompanied by an intent to abandon, and noting that in the latter case, "mental intent to 
abandon can be inferred from the physical actions."). 
This Court mentioned material abandonment most recently, albeit obliquely, in 
EDSA/Cloward, L.L.C. v. Klibanoff 2005 UT App 367, 122 P.3d 646. While the 
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defendant did not "specifically articulate[]" a material abandonment argument, the Court 
included a footnote citing Ketchum, indicating that intent should factor into an i 
abandonment inquiry, and stating that abandonment is "such a fact-sensitive question" 
that it cannot be decided as a matter of law. See id., f 25 n.4. 
As the material abandonment test relates to notice, the appropriate date for 
applying the test must be the date on which notice that lienable work is underway or has 
been abandoned becomes significant to a third-party. See Nu-Trend Elec, 786 P.2d at 
1371 ("The question is primarily one of notice; . . . ."); see also Mack Indus., Inc. v. 
Donald W. Nelson, Inc., 134 So.2d 821, 824 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961) (prior excavation and 
fill work not of "such manifest and substantial character" to provide notice of 
commencement as of date mortgage was recorded). For example, a would-be buyer of 
property on which work had occurred would consider the fact that lienable work was 
either underway or had been abandoned to be significant on the day scheduled for 
closing. Whereas the buyer could very well be expected to walk away from the 
transaction if work were underway at that time such that the land may be purchased 
subject to a prior mechanic's lien, the buyer would be more likely to close the sale if prior 
work had been abandoned and there were consequently no danger of mechanic's liens. 
In summary, the test for material abandonment very clearly involves an objective 
assessment of the site: would "a reasonable observer of the site . . . be on notice that the 
persons who performed the work apparently do not intend to continue it to 
completion[?]" Nu-Trend Elec., 786 P.2d at 1371. This test must be performed as of 
June 17, 2005, the date the Deed of Trust was recorded. To the extent that the subjective 
60 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intent of those performing or commissioning the prior work is relevant, their intent to 
abandon or continue work must be determined from visible site conditions, not from 
activities away from the project site. And, finally, abandonment is a highly fact-sensitive 
issue not appropriate for resolution on summary judgment. 
The District Court failed to apply the appropriate test for material abandonment. 
Instead, the District Court considered and based its ruling on a number of off-site 
circumstances not knowable by a reasonable observer of the Midtown Village site. For 
example, the District Court considered the following circumstances: (1) "there were 
active efforts to finance this project"; (2) "the bank didn't abandon the project"; (3) 
Midtown JV secured a construction loan and some of the money was eventually used to 
pay for the excavation work; (4) Myler courted Moyes and secured his participation in 
Midtown JV; and (5) "Mr. Myler and his various entities seemed to stay involved after 
Mr. Moyes got involved and also that the Ellsworth Paulsen Construction [sic] remained 
in the project." See Transcript, at pp. 68-69 [R. 8538]; see also Corrected Order, at p. 9 
[R. 7849] ("At no time material hereto did BankFirst materially abandon the Project. . . . 
At no time material hereto, did Larry Myler and his entities . . . materially abandon[] the 
Project."). As none of these circumstances were visible to or knowable by a reasonable 
observer of the Midtown Village site on June 17, 2005, they are all irrelevant to the 
question of material abandonment and the District Court erred in considering them. 
On June 17, 2005, a reasonable observer of the Midtown Village site would have 
seen the completed, one year-old Icon Building, a large, excavated pit and a chain-link 
fence surrounding some or all of the pit. See Krumm Deck, fflf 8-12 [R. 4864-65]; Myler 
61 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
Depo., 178:23-181:6 [R. 5059(A)]. There was no activity on the site. See Myler Depo., 
178:23-181:6 [R. 5059(A)]. No materials were stored on the site, and no equipment was t 
either in use or stored on the site. See id. There were no construction trailers or 
personnel -just the Icon Building, a pit and a fence. See Krumm Decl., Yff 8-12 [R. 
i 
4864-65]. The best evidence of what a reasonable observer of the Midtown Village site 
would think about the site, as the District Court noted, is provided by Krumm's 
declaration testimony: "the site appeared to me to have been vacated.5' See id,, <[| 12 [R. 
4864]; see also Transcript, at p. 68 [R. 8538] ("Mr. [Krumm] said the project looked 
abandoned from his perspective . . . ."). 
Given that the site appeared abandoned, the District Court erred in considering 
evidence of off-site activity and ruling that there was no material abandonment. At the 
very least, whether Midtown Village appeared abandoned to a reasonable observer on 
June 17, 2005 was a disputed issue of material fact that the District Court ought not have 
undertaken to resolve on the Lien Claimants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
v. Summary. 
The District Court erred in its relation back analysis on all fronts. The Lien 
Claimants could not and did not satisfy any of the four elements of the relation back test. 
Midtown Village was not constructed as a single project; in fact, there were at least three 
projects including construction of the Icon Building, excavation and finally, construction 
of the towers. There was never a common plan for the construction of Midtown Village. 
What plans there were changed frequently and substantially. Midtown Village was not 
built with reasonable promptness. Construction and site preparation went haltingly 
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forward only as and when Myler raised enough money to undertake more work. As the 
June 27, 2005, a Deseret Morning News article about Orem's "giant hole'5 demonstrates, 
months-long delays and "lack of movement" were the hallmarks of Midtown Village. 
See Moore Deck, % 1 [R. 4843-44, 4857]. Finally, the District Court incorrectly 
considered and relied upon off-site circumstances to determine that Midtown Village was 
not materially abandoned. To a reasonable observer of the site on June 17, 2005, 
Midtown Village appeared abandoned; the excavated hole was so large that any 
reasonable observer of the site would have expected construction to fill in the hole 
immediately. When it did not, and the site was dormant for many months, abandonment 
was the only reasonable conclusion an observer could have reached. As a result, the Lien 
Claimants' alleged mechanic's liens cannot relate back to either the construction of the 
Icon Building, or to the mass excavation begun in September 2004. At the very earliest, 
their liens attached when the South Tower spot footings were excavated months after 
June 17, 2005. The District Court should, therefore, be reversed. 
IV, THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED AND 
BASED ITS DECISION ON IRRELEVANT AND INADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE 
The District Court abused its discretion by admitting and considering evidence of 
title insurance. Appellate courts reverse trial court decisions to admit or exclude 
evidence only if the trial court's ruling was "beyond the limits of reasonability." See 
Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, f^ 21, 190 P.3d 1269 (quoting Jensen v. IHCHosps., Inc., 
2003 UT 51, % 57, 82 P.3d 1076). While trial courts consequently have significant 
discretion with respect to evidentiary decisions, the District Court abused that discretion 
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in this case by admitting and considering evidence that UWB obtained title insurance in 
connection with the Loan. < 
Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits the admission of evidence of 
liability insurance. Rule 411, which is identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, safeguards against the danger of a fact finder's knowledge of insurance 
coverage improperly influencing his or her decision on the merits. See Fed. R. Evid. 411 
(comment to 1972 proposed rule). Title insurance is a form of liability insurance. See { 
Black's Law Dictionary, 663 (abr. 8th ed. 2005) (liability insurance is cc[a]n agreement to 
cover a loss resulting from the insured's liability to a third party."); Israelsky v. Title Ins. 
Co. of Minn., 212 Cal. App. 3d 611, 620-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting any 
difference between title insurance and liability insurance claims for purposes of statutes 
of limitation); Title Ins. Corp. ofPenn. v. Wagner, 431 A.2d 179, 182 (NJ. Super. Ct. 
1981) (observing that while cited "cases do not deal with title insurance, they are 
concerned with other forms of liability insurance . . . ."). Thus, evidence of title 
insurance should have been excluded. 
Evidence of title insurance was totally irrelevant to the Lien Claimants' motion. 
Whether UWB obtained title insurance has no bearing at all on when construction 
commenced. The Lien Claimants' stated reason for offering evidence of title insurance -
that it showed UWB had actual notice that excavation work had been performed before 
making the Loan - was unfounded. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 
BankFirst's Motion to Strike, at p. 9 [R. 5312]. Actual notice of work is wholly 
irrelevant to the question of commencement. See EDSA/Cloward, L.L.C v. Klibanoff 
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2005 UT App 367, If 15, 122 P.3d 646. The only plausible reason for the Lien Claimants 
to offer such evidence was an effort to prejudice the District Court by telegraphing the 
idea that a faceless, deep-pocketed, out-of-state insurance company should foot the bill 
for Midtown JV's collapse, rather than the Lien Claimants. Rule 411 exists to prevent 
precisely this abuse and it was thus unreasonable for the District Court to admit and 
consider title insurance evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, UWB respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Lien Claimants. The 
Court should remand the case to the District Court with instructions to: (1) reconsider the 
question of lien priority under the appropriate test set forth herein, i.e., commencement 
occurs when actual construction, as opposed to mere site preparation, is begun; (2) 
properly apply the four-element Calder Bros, test for tacking back to prior work; and (3) 
exclude evidence of title insurance. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2010. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
By: ^/L/ \. . \CS 
Ronald G. Rusjsell 
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Jenifer L. Tomchak 
Attorneys for UWB United Western 
Bank 
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Utah Code Ann. §38-1-5 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2010 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
* * * STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2010 GENERAL SESSION * * * 
* * * ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2010 UT 49 (7/27/2010); 2010 UT App 209 
(7/29/2010) AND JULY 1, 2010 (FEDERAL CASES) * * * 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 1. MECHANICS1 LIENS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (2010) 
§ 38-1-5. Priority ~ Over other encumbrances 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the 
commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may 
have attached subsequently to the time when the building, improvement or structure was 
commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, 
mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which was 
unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or 
first material furnished on the ground. 
HISTORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L 1907, §§ 1384, 1835; C.L 1917, §§ 3734, 3735; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 52-1-5. 
NOTES: CROSS-REFERENCES. -Prior i ty of lessor's lien, § 38-3-2. 
LexisNexis 50 State Surveys, Legislation & Regulations 
Mechanic & Contractor Liens 




Commencement and duration of lien. 




Extent of lien. 
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Notice to lien holders. 
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± 
Priority over other liens and claims. 
Purchase money mortgage. 
*. 
Questions of law and fact. 
Real estate mortgage. 
± 




M J I 
Cited. 
* APPLICABILITY. 
This section applies to work begun on or materials furnished to the same structure or 
improvement against which liens have been filed. The statute has no application where the 
work was performed exclusively for another project. Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
¥ COMMENCEMENT AND DURATION OF LIEN. 
This section expressly provides that liens shall attach at the time the performance of the 
contract commences; accordingly, claimant's lien attaches on the date he commences the work 
or furnishes the material, and is not postponed to the date of filing the notice for record. 
Morrison v. Carey-Lombard Co., 9 Utah 70, 33 P. 238 (1893). 
Mechanic's lien takes effect as of the date of commencement of work and furnishing of 
materials, and is prior to intervening equities. Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363, 
modified on rehearing, 85 P. 1012 (1906). 
When labor and materials are furnished to one not an owner, lien attaches to title instant title 
vests in owner so contracting for labor and materials furnished before he became the owner. 
United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Midvale Home Fin. Corp., 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090, 
rehearing denied, 86 Utah 522, 46 P.2d 672 (1935). 
Whether the subsequent furnishings of materials is part of one continuous transaction, in 
which case the priority date of the lien would relate back to the first delivery date, or whether 
such furnishings constitute separate contracts, in which case there would be no relation back, is 
a question of fact. Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977). 
This section states that priority is established at the occurrence of one of two events, 
commencement to do work or delivery of materials. E.W. Allen & Assocs. v. FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 
1504 (D. Utah 1991). 
¥ COMMENCEMENT OF WORK. 
The phrase "commencement to do work," as used in this section, is construed in favor of lien 
claimants. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
Off-site preliminary architectural work, while it is lienable work against the property owner, 
does not constitute commencement of work for priority purposes under this section. Ketchum, 
Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin, Inc. v. Heritage Mt. Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
The phrase "commencement to do work" means that actual visible on-site improvements 
must be present. The improvements must be of such a nature that they represent an actual 
beginning of improvement on the ground and must be visible to the extent that a person using 
reasonable diligence in examining the premises would be able to see it and be on notice that 
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lienable work was underway. E.W. Allen & Assocs. v. FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504 (D. Utah 1991). 
Corral and temporary tack room constructed of native unfinished materials was not sufficient, 
under the commencement of work standard, to put a reasonable lender on notice that a multi-
million-dollar resort complex construction project had begun and liens could have attached. 
E.W. Allen & Assocs. v. FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504 (D. Utah 1991). 
Trial court erred in granting a summary judgment against a party seeking to enforce its 
mechanics' lien because issues of fact remained as to whether lienor had visibly commenced 
work on the property, which was needed to establish the lien's priority. EDSA/CLOWARD, L.L.C. 
v. Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, 122 P.3d 646. 
¥ ESTOPPEL. 
A person furnishing materials may be estopped by his or its acts and conduct from enjoying 
the priority accorded by this section. Spargo v. Nelson, 10 Utah 274, 37 P. 495 (1894). 
?EXTENT OF LIEN. 
While mortgagee who advances money to mortgagor to construct a building has lien prior to 
that of a subcontractor performing labor and furnishing materials for such building, such lien 
extends only to amount actually advanced on mortgage. Culmer Paint & Glass Co. v. Gleason, 
42 Utah 344, 130 P. 66 (1913). 
* NOTICE TO LIEN HOLDERS. 
This section requires other lien holders, by mortgage or otherwise, to take notice of the 
commencement of work on the building. Teahen v. Nelson, 6 Utah 363, 23 P. 764 (1890). 
Survey of property did not meet the notice standard contemplated by this section where the 
survey stakes were not sufficiently noticeable or related to actual construction to impart notice 
to a prudent lender. Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The constructive notice provided by this section defeats a claim for equitable subrogation, so 
that a painting contractor who commenced visible work on a property at least seven days prior 
to a later lender had priority, with his intervening lien, over the lender who had knowledge of it. 
Richards v. Security Pac. Nat l Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 
(Utah 1993). 
'* PRIORITY OVER OTHER LIENS AND CLAIMS. 
A deed of trust upon a canal to be constructed cannot take precedence over a mechanic's lien 
for work done and materials furnished in building the canal, although trust deed antedates the 
doing of the work or furnishing the materials. Canal is not in existence until constructed. 
Garland v. Bear Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 9 Utah 350, 34 P. 368 (1893), aff d, 
164 U.S. 1, 17 S. Ct. 7, 41 L Ed. 327 (1896). 
Lien for all of materials furnished by single lien claimant on continuous, open, running 
account, for purpose of developing and operating mine, held prior to trust deed executed by 
mining company and recorded between times when materials are first and last furnished. Fields 
v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 25 Utah 76, 69 P. 528 (1902); Salt Lake Hdwe. Co. v. Fields, 69 P. 
1134 (1902) (not officially reported). 
Where vendees of land contracts on property involved jointly assigned errors in mortgage 
foreclosure action on cross-appeal, their liens are postponed to date of last vendee's contract, 
and claims of lien claimants attach as of date when first materials are furnished and first labor 
performed; and claim of lien claimants is held superior to claim of such vendees in foreclosure 
action. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Midvale Home Fin. Corp., 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 
1090,. rehearing denied, 86 Utah 522, 46 P.2d 672 (1935). 
Lien for labor and materials supplied purchaser of lot for building constructed thereon is 
inferior to interest of vendor of the lot and his successor, where it is not shown that vendor or 
his successor consent to, ratify, or authorize the furnishing of the materials and labor. Burton 
Walker Lumber Co. v. Howard, 92 Utah 92, 66 P.2d 134 (1937). 
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In determining priorities between construction mortgagee and mechanic's lienors, mortgage 
for definite amount recorded prior to attachment of any lien takes priority up to the amount 
actually paid over any mechanic's liens attaching subsequent to recording of mortgage, 
although loan which mortgage is intended to secure is paid over to borrower as needed and 
never advanced in full. Western Mtg. Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 
424 P.2d 437 (1967). 
Recording a notice of lien does not establish priority under Utah's law of mechanics' liens. 
E.W. Allen & Assocs. v. FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504 (D. Utah 1991). 
Visible commencement of work, not record notice, establishes priority. EDSA/CLOWARD, 
L L C . v. Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, 122 P.3d 646. 
? PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE. 
A mechanic's lien is superior even to a purchase money mortgage given at time of purchase 
of property in question where mortgagee, after materials are furnished, releases original 
mortgage and takes new mortgage, which transaction, however, is not in renewal of old 
mortgage, but is done to obtain increased security on old debt. But after satisfaction of lien, 
mortgagee is entitled to surplus. Badger Coal & Lumber Co. v. Olsen, 50 Utah 307, 167 P. 680 
(1917). 
Purchase money mortgage had priority over a mechanics' lien where the mechanics' lien did 
not attach until after the mortgage was recorded. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 
(Utah 1982). 
¥ QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT. 
In action involving priority between mortgages and mechanic's lien, whether all materials 
furnished during certain period are furnished under one contract or under different contracts is 
question of fact. Gwilliam Lumber & Coal Co. v. El Monte Springs Corp., 87 Utah 134, 48 P.2d 
463 (1935). 
¥ REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE. 
A mortgagee who loans money to a mortgagor-borrower generally is not only entitled but 
obliged to pay out the money in accordance with the directions of the borrower; however, if the 
mortgagee knows that the money is being borrowed for the purpose of creating improvements 
and that materials are being furnished under such circumstances that the mortgagee should 
know that materialmen are relying on being paid from such funds, and if the mortgagee knows 
that the money is being diverted into other purposes; then under such circumstances the 
mortgagee is not accorded priority as to those funds advanced after a materialman starts 
delivering building supplies. Utah Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 11 Utah 2d 159, 356 P.2d 281 
(1960). 
A mortgagee may be estopped from claiming a priority over a mechanic's lien; however, in 
order to establish an estoppel, the lien claimant must show some concealment, 
misrepresentation, act, or declaration by the mortgagee upon which the lien holder properly 
relies and by which he is induced to act differently than he would otherwise act. Utah Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598, 15 A.LR.3d 63 (1961). 
Under this section, a properly recorded mortgage has priority over a mechanics' lien arising 
from the furnishing of labor or materials that commenced after the mortgage recordation. 
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
* RECORDATION AND NOTICE. 
From the time the contractor begins to furnish materials, it is notice to anyone thereafter 
contracting with the owner that the property is burdened with a lien, and no previous notice is 
required; and by the terms of this section, the lien relates back to the time of furnishing the 
materials. Cary-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Sheets, 10 Utah 322, 37 P. 572 (1894). 
Materialmen furnishing an occupying claimant of real estate, material for improvements 
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theron with record notice of a prior mortgage on the premises, have no lien against the true 
owner thereof; particularly where occupying claimant's claims to property are based upon fraud 
and lack of good faith. Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 47 Utah 238, 152 P. 1180 (1915). 
* RELATION BACK. 
Mechanics' liens arising from the furnishing of materials and labor, both on the overall 44-
acre site and on individual condominium units within the development, related back to the 
initial work done on the project. First of Denver Mtg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). 
The priority of all mechanic's liens arising from a project is determined by the date of 
commencement of work on the project site or furnishing materials on the site and the release of 
his claims and liens by the lien holder who so commenced work or initially furnished materials 
does not affect the priority of other liens. First of Denver Mtg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel & 
Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). 
For one contractor's lien to relate back to the commencement of work or supplying of 
materials by another contractor, both contractors' projects must have been performed in 
connection with what is essentially a single project performed under a common plan prosecuted 
with reasonable promptness and without material abandonment; however, ordinary 
maintenance and cleanup work does not constitute a sufficient basis to permit "tacking" in order 
to fix an earlier lien date under this section for labor and materials supplied. Calder Bros. Co. v. 
Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
The right to have a mechanic's lien relate back to the commencement of work is not defeated 
merely because the owners did not employ a general contractor but, instead, contracted 
individually with various subcontractors. Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734 (Utah 1985). 
Surveying, staking, and soil testing do not constitute a visible on-site improvement as 
required by Utah law for relation back. Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin, Inc. v. 
Heritage Mt. Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990). 
For priority of a mechanic's lien to relate back to the beginning of the work for which the lien 
is claimed, the work must all be part of the same project; the work must have such a continuity 
of purpose that a reasonable observer of the site would be on notice that work was underway 
for which a lien could be claimed. Nu-Trend Elec, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 786 
P.2d 1369 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
* SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT. 
Work of laying out and developing subdivision including engineering, installing water mains, 
sewer mains and laterals, curbs and gutters, surfacing streets and other off-site construction 
does not give rise to mechanic's lien attaching to particular home being constructed within 
subdivision. Western Mtg. Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 
(1967). 
¥CITED in Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097 (Ct. App. 1988); Butterfield Lumber, Inc. v. Peterson 
Mtg. Corp., 815 P.2d 1330 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AM. JUR. 2D. - 5 3 Am. Jur 2d Mechanics' Liens § 264 et seq. 
A.L.R. —What constitutes "commencement of building or improvement" for purposes of 
determining accrual of lien, 1 A.L.R.3d 822. 
Mechanic's lien based on contract with vendor pending executory contract for sale of property 
as affecting purchaser's interest, 50 A.L.R.3d 944. 
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Robert F. Babcock (USB No. 0158) 
Kent B. Scott (USB No. 2897) 
Cody W. Wilson (USB No. 9839) 
BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK PC 
Washington Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
Facsimile: (801)531-7060 
Attorneys for Several Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIM RISINGER dba MARATHON TRIADS 
CARPET MILL OUTLET, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MIDTOWN JOINT VENTURE, LC, et al. 
Defendants. 
On April 23, 2010, the Court held a hearing for the parties to present oral arguments 
regarding Plaintiff Lien Claimant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 9, 2009. 
Robert F. Babcock and Cody W. Wilson were in attendance representing Plaintiffs 
Big-D Construction Corp., Big-D Construction Corp./Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Co. - JV, 
Tim Risinger dba Marathon Triads Carpet Mill Outlet, BMC West Corporation, T.S. Electric, Inc., 
Geneva Rock Products, Inc., Aspen View Construction, LLC, Valley View Building Services, 
Inc., Carey W. Olsen, Spectrum Engineers, Inc., Wasatch Ornamental Iron, Ken Harris 
Architect, R. P. Painting & Decorating, Inc., Ellsworth Paulsen Construction, Inc., and Federal 
Insurance Company; 
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) ) 
Paul Walstad was in attendance representing Plaintiff Clayco, Inc.; 
Mark L. Poulsen was in attendance representing Plaintiffs Western States Mechanical, 
Inc., JPM, Inc. & Houghton Plaster, Inc., M.C. Green & Sons, Inc.; 
David R. Nielson was in attendance representing Plaintiffs Robert I. Merrill Co., Owell 
Precast, LLC, B&B Specialties, Inc.; 
Richard A. Rappaport was in attendance representing Plaintiff Reynolds Brothers, Inc.; 
Chris Hill was in attendance representing Plaintiff Quality Assurance Engineering; 
Mark D. Tolman was in attendance representing Plaintiff Sierra Pacific Industries; 
Mark E. Wilkey was in attendance representing Plaintiff SME Steel Fabricators, Inc.; 
Joseph D. McAllister was in attendance representing Plaintiff Firetrol Protection 
Systems, Inc.; 
Andrew Wadsworth and Bruce Shapiro were in attendance representing Midtown 
Joint Venture, LLC; 
Jared L. Anderson was in attendance representing Larry Myler; and 
Ronald G. Russell, Stephen E.W. Hale, Matthew J. Ball and Jenifer Tomchak were 
in attendance representing Defendants FDIC; Coralee Ellis; James A. Ellis; Edna H. Leavitt; The 
Leila Welling Home Family Trust; and Phyllis Wilson. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, having heard oral arguments from the 
parties, reviewed all the evidence submitted and for good cause appearing, now finds as 
follows: 
ORDER 
The Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 38-1-5 valid mechanics' liens on the Midtown property have priority over the trust 
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deeds of BankFirst, since owned by FDIC and now owned by United Western Bank, because 
visible construction work on the Main Building of the Midtown Village Project ("Project") 
commenced prior to the recording of the BankFirst trust deeds and the undisputed facts support 
the conclusion that the Project was not materially abandoned from the time the excavation work 
commenced in the fall of 2004 to the time the first loan closed in June 2005. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Excavation work was performed at the property located at 320 South State Street 
in Orem, Utah commonly referred to as Midtown Village (the "Project") beginning in September 
2004 through early 2005. Larry Myler Deposition, P. 31, Tf 17-23 and P.32, If6-12; P.41, p to 
P.43, TJ18; P.114,1J5-13; Brett Harris Deposition, P.110, fi14-17; PP.115-120; Gary Reynolds 
Deposition, P.58 to P.60, IP 7-20; Deposition Exhibits 96, 154 & 158. 
2. The dimension of the excavation work performed in late 2004 was approximately 
400' in length, 150' in width and 22' in depth. Larry Myler Deposition, P. 31, ft17-23 and P.32, 
1J6-12; Deposition Exhibit 154. 
3. The excavated hole was for the mat footing and underground parking structure 
for the south wing of the Main Building. Allen Washburn Deposition, P.118,1J25 to P. 120, fl14; 
Larry Myler Deposition, P. 31, fl17-23; P. 202, TJ14-18; Brett Harris Deposition, P.98, fl9 to 
P. 100, fl11; Deposition Exhibit 20. 
4. A second hole for the north wing of the Main Building was also excavated in late 
2004 and early 2005. Larry Myler Deposition, P.41, fl8 to P.43, fl18; Gary Reynolds Deposition, 
P.60, H17-20; P.65,1J16-24; P.113, fl1-21; P.138, f l 8 to P.141, p (as corrected); Deposition 
Exhibits 96, 158. 
5. The walls of the excavation identified above were stabilized with gunite and soil 
nails. Tod Wadsworth Deposition, P.50,fi6 to P.51, If 12; Deposition Exhibits 24, 129, 162, 190. 
1333.122 Order 3 
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6. The excavation work was readily visible to anyone that visited the Project site. 
Jim Krumm Deposition, P.96, U2to P.99,1J11; Larry Myler Deposition, P. 31, f17-23 and P.32, 
lf6-12; P.43, Tf9-18; P. 61, fl 6-25; P.114,1J5-13; Adella Pearson Deposition, P.50,1J21-25; P.58, 
fl25 to P.61,1J21; Deposition Exhibits 96, 165. 
7. The excavation for the mat footing and the underground parking became part of 
the overall work of improvement for the Main Building of the Project. Larry Myler Deposition, 
P.202,1f14-18. 
8. The construction deed of trust of BankFirst to secure a loan in the amount of $42 
million ("BankFirst Loan") was recorded on June 17, 2005 ("BankFirst Deed of Trust"). 
Deposition Exhibit 161. 
9. Before the loan closed both a representative of BankFirst and a representative of 
Equity Title Company, who was handling the loan closing, actually observed the excavation 
work identified above. Jim Krumm Deposition, P.96,1}2 to P.99, fl11; Larry Myler Deposition, 
P.60,1(16 to P.61,1J25; Adella Pearson Deposition, P.50, p i to P.52, fl4; P.58, fl25 to P.59, 1J9; 
P.61, U5-20; Deposition Exhibit 165. 
10. Prior to the loan closing, on June 15, 2005, the representative of Equity Title 
Company completed a Mechanics Lien Risk Analysis form indicating that her opinion based 
upon her inspection of the site was that excavation work on the improvement had commenced 
and that lien claimants existed. Adella Pearson Deposition, P.50, fi21 to P.52, fl4; P.61,1J5-20; 
Deposition Exhibit 165. 
11. The funds used from the BankFirst Loan, were intended for, and were used for 
the building of the Main Building of the Project, including further and extensive work on the 
premises by Plaintiffs. Larry Myler Deposition, P.139, J[5-8. 
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12. Mr. Larry Myler ("Mr. Myler") was the developer of the Project and was the 
principal contact person for each of the entities that he controlled in developing the Project 
including Western Oasis, Tower Development Services, Midtown LLC, and the Midtown Village 
Joint Venture. Larry Myler Deposition, P. 136,fl2-6; P. 152,1J15 to P. 155,1J10-13; P. 116, fl25 to 
P. 118, p . 
13. Midtown Village Joint Venture was the successor of the interests of Western 
Oasis, Tower Development Services, and Midtown LLC, in the development of the Project. 
Larry Myler Deposition, P. 116, fl25 to P. 118, fl3; P. 136,1J2-6; P. 152, TJ15 to P. 155,1J10-13. 
14. BankFirst was the lender that worked with Mr. Myler from July of 2004 until 
BankFirst funded the $42 million loan in June of 2005. Jim Krumm Deposition, P.34, J[21 to 
P.35,1J11; P.44,1J24to1J45; P.46, 1J3-21; P. 56,1J24 to P.57, TJ5; P.70, f l 4 t o P.71,1J6; P.77, 
IP 1-22; P.78, p to P.79,flO; P.86, fl5-15; Deposition Exhibits 155, 181, 184, 186, 187, 189, 
193. 
15. BankFirst (1) provided the Developer with a loan commitment letter for the 
Project in August 2004 (Deposition Exhibit 181; Jim Krumm Deposition, P.27); (2) required from 
the Developer a $15,000 good faith deposit for the Project loan in August of 2004 (Deposition 
Exhibit 183; Jim Krumm Deposition, P.39,1J10-23); (3) helped arrange for a $562,000 loan to 
permit the Developer to commence excavating at the Project in September 2004 (Deposition 
Exhibits 153, 182; Jim Krumm Deposition, P.36, fl23 to P.37,1J18; P.65, fl1-9; Larry Myler 
Deposition, P.26,1J22 to P.27, fl17); (4) developed and created its marketing package in 
September 2004 and began acquiring subscriptions from participant banks in October 2004 
(Deposition Exhibits 184, 185, 186, 187; Jim Krumm Deposition, P.42, 45, 48, 51); (5) persisted 
in its efforts to finance the Project until it succeeded in having the loan closed in June of 2005 
(Deposition Exhibits187, 188; Jim Krumm Deposition, P.51, 54); (6) acquired subscriptions from 
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participant banks in October and November of 2004 (Deposition Exhibits 184, 185, 186, 187; 
Jim Krumm Deposition, P.42, 45, 48, 51); (7) approved a stronger guarantor for the Developer 
to improve the marketing package in December of 2004 (Deposition Exhibit 188; Jim Krumm 
Deposition, P.54); (8) maintained existing participant banks and acquired subscriptions from 
additional participant banks in 2005 (one (1) in January; eight (8) in March; seven (7) in April; 
four (4) in May; and eight (8) in June)(Deposition Exhibits 185, 186, 187, 188; Jim Krumm 
Deposition, P.45, 48, 51, 54). 
16. At all material times the architect was Ken Harris Architects. Larry Myler 
Deposition, P. 17, fl25to P. 18, TJ4; Brett Harris Deposition, P. 15, TJ3-8; Deposition Exhibits 4, 18, 
19,155,181,193. 
17. At all times material hereto, the Project has been a mixed use project with 
residential condos, professional offices, and retail spaces, in a Main Building situated in a "U" 
shape consisting of South, North and West wings with a central courtyard surrounding an Icon 
Tower. The Project was designed to have underground parking with approximately 98,000 
square feet of retail on the first floors; 106,000 square feet of office space on the second floors; 
and 243 residential condominiums on the third through seventh floors. More than 50% of the 
243 residential condos had been pre-sold and more than 50% of the retail space had been pre-
leased, before and while, BankFirst was marketing the financing package to participant banks. 
Larry Myler Deposition, P.36, ft4to P.37, fl10; P.39, fl9to P.40, f l 1 ; Deposition Exhibits 115, 
181,189,193. 
18. At all times material hereto, there was a common plan on the Project - the 
Project remained a mixed use project with essentially the same make up in the uses. Larry 
Myler Deposition, P.20, tf2 to P.21, fl12; P.36, fl4 to P.37, fi10; P.39, fl9 to P.40,1J11; Deposition 
Exhibits 115, 181,189, 193. 
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19. BankFirst and its bank representative to the Project were actively engaged in 
efforts to finance this Project, and five (5) months after the work on the excavation stopped, the 
loan was committed and closed. Deposition Exhibits 161, 180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188. 
20. From the loan closing on June 15, 2005, $650,000.00 from the loan proceeds 
was used to pay for the excavation work performed in September 2004 and early 2005 and 
$150,000 from the loan proceeds was used to pay for the gunite and soil nailing shoring work. 
"Admitted" by BankFirst in Request for Admission No. 17 in response to the Request for 
Admissions by Big-D, et. a/., dated June 16, 2009 said admission being made after a recitation 
of general objections to the request; Deposition Exhibit 190. 
21. At the request of BankFirst for an additional guarantor, Myler made efforts to 
bring Mr. Jerry Moyes ("Mr. Moyes") in as an additional guarantor on the construction loan for 
the Project. Those efforts succeeded and Mr. Moyes became an additional guarantor on the 
loan to BankFirst in order for Midtown Village JVto obtain the loan from BankFirst. Jim Krumm 
Deposition, P.52,1J21 to P.53,1J24; Larry Myler Deposition, P.46, fl3 to P.47,1J6; Deposition 
Exhibit 188. 
22. There were ongoing efforts by BankFirst to market and close the loan during the 
fall of 2004 up through and until the loan,closed in June of 2005. Deposition Exhibits 161, 180, 
181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188. 
23. Mr. Myler and his various entities remained involved on the Project after Mr. 
Moyes got involved as a guarantor for the loan. See Development Agreements attached 
Exhibits "B" & "C" to Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment; Larry Myler Deposition, P. 116, fl25 to P. 118, P ; P. 136, fl2 to P. 137, fl6; P. 152, If 15 
to P. 156,H20. 
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24. Ellsworth Paulsen Construction remained involved with the Project even though it 
worked with two other contractors during the course of the Project: Bud Bailey Construction 
was a co-general contractor before the loan closed, and Big-D was the co-general contractor 
after the loan closed. Larry Myler Deposition, P.89, fl25 to P.94, jf17; Deposition Exhibits 18, 
19,21. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. ISSUE OF PROCEDURE. 
1. Priority is an element of the Plaintiffs' case, an element that Plaintiffs must establish; 
therefore Plaintiffs are not prohibited from proceeding in the manner they have chosen by 
addressing the priority issue on the Project prior to addressing the element of lien validity. 
2. The Court rejects the argument of Defendants that the Motion for Summary Judgment is 
premature. 
II. ISSUE OF PRIORITY. 
1. In accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-5 and E.W. Allen Associates, Inc. v. 
FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504 (1991), to determine the priority date of a mechanics' lien against 
another encumbrance, the Court must look to the commencement of work on the structure or 
improvements. 
2. The substantial excavation work done in September 2004 through early 2005 was not 
mere site preparation work; rather it was clearly the commencement of a large construction 
project. 
3. The substantial excavation work done in September 2004 through early 2005 constitutes 
constructive notice that work had commenced on the Main Building of the Project and that 
construction was underway. 
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4. The substantial excavation work done in September 2004 through early 2005 also 
constituted actual notice to both BankFirst and the title company that work had commenced on 
the Main Building of the Project and that construction was underway. 
5. The excavation for the underground parking and the mat footings in September 2004 
and early 2005 constituted the commencement of work on the Project pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 38-1-5, and all valid mechanics' liens relate back to the commencement of that 
work in September of 2004 and have priority over any encumbrance which attached subsequent 
to September, 2004. 
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-5, the valid mechanics' liens for work on the 
Project have priority over the subsequently recorded BankFirst Deeds of Trust. 
111. ISSUE OF MATERIAL ABANDONMENT. 
1. In accordance with Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett Nickel & Austin v. Heritage 
Mountain Development Co., 784 P.2d 1217 (1989), to determine whether material abandonment 
has occurred, the Court must determine if a single project was constructed under a common 
plan and prosecuted with reasonable promptness. 
2. At no time material hereto did BankFirst materially abandon the Project. 
3. At no time material hereto, did Larry Myler and his entities, including Western 
Oasis, Tower Development Services, Midtown LLC, and the Midtown Village Joint Venture, 
materially abandoned the Project. 
4. The Project was a single project constructed under a common plan. 
5. Any design changes that occurred were never such that the changes would 
signal that the Project that had been conceptualized was abandoned and a new different project 
was being commenced. 
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6. The same project that was commenced with the excavation for the mat footings 
and the underground parking was prosecuted, under the circumstances of this Project, with 
reasonable promptness without material abandonment. 
7. Any delay in this Project resulting from financial problems did not constitute an 
abandonment of the Project given the continued efforts by those involved including BankFirst to 
resolve those financial problems and the success of those efforts within approximately five (5) 
months resulted in the construction loan sold to participant banks, funded and closed. 
8. No cessation of work on the Project occurred that would be sufficient to put a 
reasonable observer on notice that the Project had been abandoned. 
9. The Project did not stop and another project was not initiated. 
10. The Project was not materially abandoned from the time the excavation work 
commenced in the fall of 2004 to the time that the loan closed in June 2005. 
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Robert F. Babcock (USB No. 0158) 
Kent B. Scott (USB No. 2897) 
Cody W. Wilson (USB No. 9839) 
BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK PC 
Washington Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
Facsimile: (801)531-7060 
Attorneys for Several Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIM RISINGER dba MARATHON TRIADS 
CARPET MILL OUTLET, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MIDTOWN JOINT VENTURE, LC, 'et al. 
Defendants. 
On April 23, 2010, the Court held a hearing for the parties to present evidence and oral 
arguments regarding Defendants Motion to Strike filed on July 31, 2009. 
Robert F. Babcock and Cody W. Wilson were in attendance representing Plaintiffs 
Big-D Construction Corp., Big-D Construction Corp./Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Co. - JV, 
Tim Risinger dba Marathon Triads Carpet Mill Outlet, BMC West Corporation, T.S. Electric, Inc., 
Geneva Rock Products, Inc., Aspen View Construction, LLC, Valley View Building Services, 
Inc., Carey W. Olsen, Spectrum Engineers, Inc., Wasatch Ornamental Iron, Ken Harris 
Architect, R. P. Painting & Decorating, Inc., Ellsworth Paulsen Construction, Inc., and Federal 
Insurance Company; 
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Paul Walstad was in attendance representing Plaintiff Clayco, Inc.; 
Mark L Poulsen was in attendance representing Plaintiffs Western States Mechanical, 
Inc., JPM, Inc. & Houghton Plaster, Inc., M.C. Green & Sons, Inc.; 
David R. Nielson was in attendance representing Plaintiffs Robert I. Merrill Co., Dwell 
Precast, LLC, B&B Specialties, Inc.; 
Richard A. Rappaportwas in attendance representing Plaintiff Reynolds Brothers, Inc.; 
Chris Hill was in attendance representing Plaintiff Quality Assurance Engineering; 
Mark D. Tolman was in attendance representing Plaintiff Sierra Pacific Industries; 
Mark E. Wilkey was in attendance representing Plaintiff SME Steel Fabricators, Inc.; 
Joseph D. McAllister was in attendance representing Plaintiff Firetrol Protection 
Systems, Inc.; 
Andrew Wadsworth and Bruce Shapiro were in attendance representing Midtown 
Joint Venture, LLC; 
Jared L. Anderson was in attendance representing Larry Myler; and 
Ronald G. Russell, Stephen E.W. Hale, Matthew J. Ball and Jenifer Tomchak were 
in attendance representing Defendants Bank First; Coralee Ellis; James A. Ellis; Edna H. 
Leavitt; The Leila Welling Home Family Trust; and Phyllis Wilson. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, having heard oral arguments from the 
parties, reviewed all the evidence submitted and for good cause appearing, now finds as 
follows: 
ORDER 
The Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. The Court has disregarded the facts which the Defendants moved to strike with the 
exception of title insurance information, which the Court considered only for the purpose of 
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showing notice, having nothing to do with negligence, policies or commitments. The Court did 
not review any title insurance policies or commitments in rendering this decision. 
2. The Court finds that there are sufficient undisputed facts, upon which to decide the 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 9, 2009. 
3. Therefore, Defendants July 31, 2009 Motion to Strike is hereby DENIED. 
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Orem City issues building permit for Icon Building to '"Midtown Village/Larry 
Myler."1 
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company contracts with Tower Development 
Services, Inc. to build the Icon Building. 
Western Oasis Properties, LC conveys the Icon Building property built to Tower 
Development Services, Inc. 
Icon Building construction completed.4 
Ellsworth Paulsen Residential, LLC contracts with Tower Development Services 
to build Midtown Village.5 
Marshall Bank, N.A. loans $562,000 to Western Oasis Properties, LC for 
excavation work. 
Orem City authorizes excavation. 
Larry Myler contracts with Reynolds Brothers, Inc. for excavation. 
Excavation work performed by Reynolds Brothers.9 
Ownership of Midtown Village property transferred to Tower Development 
Services, Inc.10 i 
Midtown Joint Venture, LC formed by Larry Myler's company, Midtown 
Village, LLC, and Jerry Moyes' company, Carefree Capital Investments, LLC.11 
Tower Development Services, Inc. conveys Midtown Village property to 
Midtown Joint Venture, LC.12 
Ellsworth Paulsen/Bud Bailey Construction, Inc. Joint Venture contracts with 
Tower Development Services to build Midtown Village for $59 million.13 | 
I
 Declaration of Tamara Berdall [R. 4891 - 4900] 
deposition Exhibit 4 [R. 5059(A)]; Myler Depo., 154:15-25, 162:7-163:10; [R. 5059(A)] 
3
 [R. 4953, 4970] 
4[R. 1613] 
5
 [Myler Deposition, 72:20-73:20; R. 5059(A); Deposition Exhibit 18] 
6
 Myler Depo. 27:9-28 - 28:5 [R. 5059(A)]; Deposition Exhibit 153 
7
 Declaration of Tamara Berdall [R. 4889,4899-4900] 
8
 Depo. Exhibit 62 [R. 5059(A)] 
9
 Gary Reynolds Depo. 53:20-55:19,65:15-66:15, 110:5-111:15, 123:17-124:3 [R. 5059(A)] 
10
 Snyder Decl., [^15 [R. 4929-30,4969] 
II
 Myler Depo. 23:16-24:16,155:3-156:20 [R. 5059] 
12
 Snyder Decl., K18 [R. 4920-21,4968] 
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BankFirst's Construction Trust Deed recorded.14 
Tower Development Services, Inc. conveys Midtown Village property to 
Western Oasis Properties, LC.15 
Western Oasis Properties, LC conveys Midtown Village property to Tower 
Development Services, Inc.16 
Big-D Construction Corp./Ellsworth Paulsen Joint Venture contracts with 
Midtown Joint Venture, LC to build Midtown Village for $59 million.17 
Orem City issues temporary permit to Tower Development Services, Inc. to 
1 Q 
build the South Tower underground parking structure. 
Big-D Construction Corp./Ellsworth Paulsen Joint Venture files "Notice of 
Commencement" for parking structure in State Construction Registry.19 
Orem City issues building permit for above-ground portion of South Tower.20 
13
 Washburn Aff. 1(20-21 [R. 1611.]; Deposition Exhibit 19. 
14
 Myler Depo. 62:19-63:19; Deposition Exhibit #161 [R. 50559(A)] 
15
 Snyder Decl., f 16 [R. 4926 - 4968] 
16
 Snyder Decl., 1fl7 [R. 4923-24; 4968] 
17
 Deposition Exhibit #21 [R. 5059] 
18
 Beardall Decl., ffl[9-10 [R. 4878, 4898] 
19
 Deposition Exhibit #29 [R. 5059(A)] 
20
 Beardall Decl., fl 1 [R. 4876,4897] 
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[2]
 Deposition of Lawrence J. Myler, 72:20-73:20 [R. 5059(A)]; Standard Form of D 
[3]
 Declaration of Tamara Beardall, If 5 [R. 4889,4898,4900]. 
[4]
 Deposition of Lawrence J. Myler, 23:16-24:18, 155:3-156:20 [R. 5059(A)]. 
[5]
 Declaration of Mark J. Snyder, 118 [R. 4920-21,4968]. 
[6]
 Deposition of Lawrence J. Myler, 62:19-63:19; Construction Deed of Trust, Abso 
[7]
 Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, Deposition Exhibit 
81
 Declaration of Tamara Beardall, ffll 9-10 [R. 4878,4898]. 
9]
 Declaration of Susan Moore, 14 [R. 4851-53,4858]; Search Results, Deposition 1 
10]
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